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Drilling and Community Consent: How Oil and 
Gas Boards Can Address the Public Health 
Threats Posed by Fracking 
Ellie Bastian∗ 
  INTRODUCTION   
In 2013, an international shale gas developer requested a 
permit to drill an exploratory well near the sleepy town of Belfry, 
Montana,1 population 218.2 Local citizens’ organizations de-
manded a hearing.3 Ten people spoke against the exploratory 
well, including a nearby organic farmer, a registered nurse, a 
goat raiser, and an environmental geologist.4 After taking these 
comments into consideration, the Montana Board of Oil and Gas 
granted a permit to the company.5 In effect, that permit not only 
entitled the company to drill an exploratory well, but also to pro-
ceed with any subsequent well development—including, for ex-
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota. Thank you to Professor 
Ann Burkhart for her constructive advice on each revision of this Note. Thank 
you to the many members of Minnesota Law Review who helped polish and 
shape my writing. Thank you, finally, to the experts and practitioners who 
kindly responded to my research inquiries. Copyright © 2017 by Ellie Bastian. 
 1. Appellants’/Plaintiffs’ Response Brief at 1, Carbon Cty. Res. Council v. 
Mont. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 380 P.3d 798 (Mont. 2016) (No. DA 15-
0613). 
 2. U.S. Census Bureau, Belfry CDP, Montana Population, AMERICAN 
FACTFINDER (2010), https://www.factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/ 
community_facts.xhtml (search in the search bar for “Belfry, CDP Montana”). 
 3. Appellee’s Answer Brief at 5, Carbon Cty. Res. Council v. Mont. Bd. of 
Oil & Gas Conservation, 380 P.3d 798 (Mont. 2016) (No. DA 15-0613). 
 4. Id. at 7. 
 5. Id. at 9. The Board included one of the geologist’s suggested mitigation 
measures, requiring the company to adhere to a certain standard for water man-
agement (“should hydraulic fracturing be used”), as one of the conditions of re-
ceiving the permit. Id. 
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ample, hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and wastewater proce-
dures—without any additional notification to the public.6 After 
that initial hearing, the oil company’s remaining civic obligation 
was to inform the Board at least forty-eight hours before using 
any “completion treatment” not mentioned in the permit.7  
This policy is problematic. Drilling for oil and gas is an in-
herently risky endeavor, both for those working in the industry 
and those living nearby.8 Fracking and its associated 
wastewaters have been blamed for causing earthquakes, pollut-
ing the air, and polluting ground and surface water.9 To frack, 
petroleum companies shoot a mixture of water and chemicals 
into the ground.10 This toxic wastewater comes back up with the 
gas and must be dealt with one way or another—for example, by 
storing it in a pit.11 But such a practice does not ensure safety: 
“[o]ften these pits are unlined. . . . [and] even if they are lined, 
the liners can tear and contaminate soil and possibly groundwa-
ter with toxic chemicals.”12 
As it turns out, the citizens of Belfry were lucky even to be 
able to demand a hearing about the exploratory well permit.13 
 
 6. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n at 9, Carbon Cty. 
Res. Council v. Mont. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 380 P.3d 798 (Mont. 2016) 
(No. DA 15-0613). 
 7. See id. (explaining that when companies fill out permit applications for 
exploratory wells, they cannot know in advance whether “completion treat-
ments” like hydraulic fracturing, acidizing, or chemical stimulation will be re-
quired—which is why the forty-eight-hour rule is helpful). 
 8. See Ivan Penn, “We Cannot Breathe:” A Poor Alabama Town Has Lived 
with the Rotten Egg Stench of Gas for 8 Years, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2016), http:// 
www.latimes.com/projects/la-fi-eight-mile-leak; Monte Whaley & John Ingold, 
Drilling Through Danger, DENV. POST (Sept. 25, 2016), http://extras.denverpost 
.com/oil-gas-deaths (“In the oil field, there is a kaleidoscope of ways workers can 
die.”).  
 9. See K. M. Keranen et al., Sharp Increase in Central Oklahoma Seismic-
ity Since 2008 Induced by Massive Wastewater Injection, 345 SCIENCE 448, 448–
51 (2014); Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Rev-
olution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strat-
egy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 180–97 (2013); American Lung Association Gives 
Sublette County an ‘F ’ for Ozone Pollution, ENVT’L. DEF. FUND (Apr. 25, 
2013), https://www.edf.org/news/american-lung-association-gives-sublette 
-county-‘f ’-ozone-pollution. 
 10. See What Is Fracking and Why Is It Controversial?, BBC (Dec. 16, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-14432401. 
 11. See Hydraulic Fracturing 101, EARTHWORKS, https://www 
.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/hydraulic_fracturing_101 (last visited Oct. 
13, 2017). 
 12. Id. 
 13. For example, citizens in Colorado do not have the option of a public 
hearing before a drilling operation commences, while those in Texas can request 
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More often, oil and gas companies are not subject to any formal 
protest.14 Instead, they obtain the proper permits from the state 
agency and proceed with whatever additional phases of drilling 
seem appropriate for that location, obtaining additional permits 
if necessary.15 Nearby property owners cannot act preemptively 
to, for example, make anticipatory nuisance claims.16 It is only 
much later, if actual harm occurs and is documented, that a 
nearby property owner can file a lawsuit and potentially recover 
damages.17 
This Note argues that most state oil and gas boards do not 
provide adequate protections to the public.18 People living near 
petroleum drilling operations should be entitled to a greater role 
in the decision-making process. This is especially true for adja-
cent property owners, whose land and even personal health 
could potentially be immediately affected by the proposed drill-
ing activity. Although open meeting laws like those in Montana 
do allow citizens to voice their concerns, making a statement at 
a little-publicized hearing is not enough. 
Part I of this Note conducts an overview of the drilling pro-
cess and its associated public health concerns. It then compares 
the hearing and notice regimes of various state-level oil and gas 
boards, using Montana and Colorado as case studies. This Part 
demonstrates that the procedures in those two states provide 
greater safeguards to the public than most other petroleum-pro-
ducing states. Part II contends that the oil and gas boards of 
 
a hearing only if they meet the narrow “protested application” requirements. 
See infra Part I.B, Table 1. 
 14. See, e.g., JAMES T. O’REILLY, THE LAW OF FRACKING § 6:5 (Westlaw 
2016) (“When the permit is issued, no public notice is required in most states, 
so the fact of state permission is only made public when the drillers arrive to 
begin work on the site preparations.”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. § 14:5. 
 17. See, e.g., EMMETT ENVTL. LAW & POLICY CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH., A 
LANDOWNER’S GUIDE TO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 2 (2014), http://blogs.harvard 
.edu/environmentallawprogram/files/2014/08/ELPC-Fracking-Leasing-Guide 
-UPDATED-July-2014_booklet-2-page-view.pdf (“[N]o lease can completely pre-
vent harm . . . . [R]emember that it is impossible to eliminate all risk, no matter 
what terms you include in your lease.”) (emphasis omitted). See generally 
O’REILLY, supra note 14, § 14:5 (comparing how juries in different cases have 
responded to damage claims for nuisance, typically considering loss of market 
value for property, the cost of repairs, and other general damages for inconven-
ience, discomfort, or annoyance). Of course, the property owners who decided to 
lease their land for oil and gas extraction could themselves be harmed. 
 18. This Note generally refers to such agencies as oil and gas boards, 
though the agencies also go by other titles, such as commissions or divisions. 
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most states, as they are currently designed, do not provide ade-
quate protections to the public—particularly to adjacent prop-
erty owners. 
Part III suggests that protections should be strengthened by 
(1) requiring mandatory public forums for all exploratory wells 
outside of an existing field; and (2) mandating direct notice of 
those forums, by mail, to adjacent property owners. Further-
more, oil and gas boards should have at least one member with 
a background in ecology or wildlife biology, and one member with 
a background in public health. Finally, each oil and gas board 
should establish an epidemiological monitoring program to over-
see pollution at all drilling fields in their state. These recommen-
dations have drawbacks, including hamstringing the petroleum 
industry to a greater degree than it has become accustomed. But, 
they would strengthen the rights of those who must live with the 
consequences of industrial activity, long after the drilling is 
done. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE DRILLING PROCESS, ITS 
ASSOCIATED HEALTH THREATS, AND THE AGENCIES 
THAT GOVERN IT ALL   
Oil and natural gas have been called “the engine of the world 
economy.”19 Together, they account for over half of humanity’s 
primary energy supply.20 Some say “our world would almost 
grind to a halt without oil.”21 In 2016, natural gas surpassed coal 
as the leading fuel for electricity generation in the United 
States.22 As the industry has grown and made itself indispensa-
ble, states have had to contend with how to regulate and monitor 
its activity. This Part presents an overview of the segment of the 
 
 19. Maizar Rahman, Indonesian Governor for OPEC, Speech at the Tenth 
International Financial and Economic Forum: Oil and Gas: The Engine of the 
World Economy (Nov. 10, 2004), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/900.htm. 
 20. Ryan Carlyle, What Are the Top Five Facts Everyone Should Know 
About Oil Exploration?, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
quora/2013/04/03/what-are-the-top-five-facts-everyone-should-know-about-oil 
-exploration. 
 21. David Winder, The Importance of Oil in Our World Today, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 31, 1983), https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0131/013137 
.html. 
 22. John Wihbey, Pros and Cons of Fracking: Research Updates, YALE CLI-
MATE CONNECTIONS (June 6, 2017), http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/ 
2017/06/pros-and-cons-of-fracking-research-updates. 
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petroleum industry pertinent to this Note: the extraction of on-
shore natural gas on private land in the United States.23 Frack-
ing, a technique for extracting such natural gas, is now happen-
ing in twenty-one states across the nation,24 with others like 
Alaska25 and Illinois26 likely joining soon. This activity is pri-
marily regulated through state common law and through the en-
abling acts that charge oil and gas boards with the authority to 
grant and oversee the permit process.27 Section A gives a brief 
history of drilling for oil and gas. It discusses the potential public 
health and environmental hazards associated with the modern 
petroleum industry. Section B examines the enabling acts of 
state-level oil and gas boards and compares the ways various 
states have chosen to design them, focusing primarily on the en-
hanced protections that Montana and Colorado offer. 
A. THE DRILLING PROCESS AND ITS POTENTIAL HAZARDS 
The relationship between humans and petroleum spans 
thousands of years.28 People living in ancient Mesopotamia used 
petroleum products to coat their floors and light their homes.29 
In 1821, the first natural gas well was drilled, followed by a ru-
dimentary form of fracking by the end of that century.30 Only in 
the 1990s were modern fracking techniques developed.31 While 
 
 23. Though petroleum and oil are sometimes used interchangeably, this 
Note refers to petroleum as an umbrella term encompassing both oil and natu-
ral gas. See Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/ 
tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=P#petro (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) (“Petroleum: A 
broadly defined class . . . . Included are crude oil, . . . refined products obtained 
from the processing of crude oil, and natural gas plant liquids.”). 
 24. See Zahra Hirji & Lisa Song, Map: The Fracking Boom, State by State, 
INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.insideclimatenews.org/ 
news/20150120/map-fracking-boom-state-state. 
 25. See Alex DeMarban, Explorer Plans First Test of Fracking Potential in 
North Slope Shale, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Apr. 23, 2017), https://www.adn 
.com/business-economy/energy/2017/04/23/explorer-plans-first-test-of-oil 
-potential-in-prudhoe-bay-shale. 
 26. See Illinois’ First Fracking Permit Reignites Controversy, U.S. NEWS 
(June 26, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/illinois/articles/ 
2017-06-26/illinois-first-fracking-permit-reignites-controversy. 
 27. See LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 231 (2015); 
O’REILLY, supra note 14. 
 28. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 27, at 115. 
 29. VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY TRANSITIONS: HISTORY, REQUIREMENTS, PRO-
SPECTS 33 (2010). 
 30. DAVID E. NEWTON, FRACKING 317–18 (2015). 
 31. See Stacey Vanek Smith, How an Engineer ’s Desperate Experiment Cre-
ated Fracking, NPR (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/09/27/ 
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oil dominates the transportation sector, natural gas is key for 
heating homes and for electricity production.32 This Section first 
discusses the modern process of extracting petroleum. It then 
examines the concomitant environmental and human health 
hazards. 
1. Petroleum and the Basic Steps of Petroleum Extraction 
Petroleum, which is a material made up of pressurized re-
mains of ancient sea life, is found within shale formations 
throughout the world.33 It comes in various forms, including oil 
and natural gas.34 Oil is found in underground reservoirs—a 
misnomer since the oil is not pooled like a sea, but is rather 
trapped as tiny droplets in rocks.35 It is recovered through drilled 
wells, and then refined to be converted into usable fuels.36 Simi-
lar to oil deposits, natural gas migrates underground until it be-
comes trapped in an area with the proper geologic makeup: po-
rous reservoir rock capped by an impenetrable rock.37 The word 
fracking refers to the processes that make up this newer phe-
nomenon of high-volume hydraulic fracturing.38 Drillers search-
ing for natural gas use fracking to create fissures in tight under-
ground shale formations with low permeability.39 These fissures 
allow the gas—otherwise inaccessible—to flow to the surface 
through the injected pipe.40 By the 1990s and 2000s, the innova-
tions of horizontal drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracturing 
changed the natural gas landscape: (1) companies could drill in 
places previously inaccessible; and (2) companies realized they 
 
495671385/how-an-engineers-desperate-experiment-created-fracking (explain-
ing the inception of high-volume hydraulic fracturing). 
 32. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 27, at 118, 125. 
 33. See Jeffrey J. Brown, General Characteristics of Shale Plays, in THE 
SHALE ENERGY REVOLUTION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE 1–2 (Sarah Casey ed., 2015). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FOSSIL ENERGY STUDY GUIDE: OIL, 1 (2013), 
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/HS_Oil_Studyguide_draft2.pdf. 
 36. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 27, at 116. 
 37. See Brown, supra note 33, at 2–3. 
 38. See Hirji & Song, supra note 24. 
 39. See generally Hydraulic Fracturing 101, supra note 11 (explaining the 
process of hydraulic fracturing and associated issues). This method is utilized 
for both oil and natural gas. Brown, supra note 33, at 3. 
 40. JESSICA SMARTT GULLION, FRACKING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RELUC-
TANT ACTIVISTS AND NATURAL GAS DRILLING 39–40 (2015). For additional in-
formation about the process of natural gas extraction, see id. at 39–46. 
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could supplement the chemical mixtures41 with millions of gal-
lons of water per well,42 making the endeavor more cost-effec-
tive.43 
It is not always easy for petroleum companies to find a res-
ervoir of oil or natural gas that will be cost-effective to drill.44 In 
order for companies to find new production fields, they must en-
gage in exploratory drilling.45 A diagnostic fracture injection 
test, or DFIT, can be used to “test a well’s reservoir pressure be-
fore it is productive.”46 It is possible to conduct a DFIT using only 
water, but it is more common to supplement the water with a 
chemical like potassium chloride.47 If the tests indicate that a 
particular location will not be sufficiently productive, the well 
will be abandoned.48 If the tests indicate that it is worthwhile to 
prepare the vertical hole for production, then the company will 
commence the completion process.49 Drilling rigs run around the 
 
 41. See AM. ENTER. INST., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: UNLOCKING AMER-
ICA’S NATURAL GAS RESOURCES 8 (2014), http://www.api.org/~/media/files/ 
policy/exploration/hydraulic_fracturing_primer.ashx (describing the purpose 
and common application of ten fracking chemicals, comparing them to laundry 
detergent and deodorant). But cf. Theo Colborn et al., An Exploratory Study of 
Air Quality Near Natural Gas Operations, 20 HUMAN & ECOLOGICAL RISK AS-
SESSMENT: AN INT’L J. 1, 98 (2014) (listing hazardous chemicals not mentioned 
in the previous report, including benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene, and 
methane). 
 42. In 2015, the average amount of water used per well was 5.3 million gal-
lons; the total nationwide from January 2011 to January 2016 was 358.4 billion 
gallons. CERES, AN INVESTOR GUIDE TO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND WATER 
STRESS 7 (2016), https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/projects/nepa/ 
68426/102904/125791/CERES_2016_An_Investor_Guide_to_Hydraulic_ 
Fracturing_and_Water_Stress.pdf. 
 43. See Smith, supra note 31 (“The well fracked with water was almost 
twice as productive as the gel-fracked well—twice as productive and half as ex-
pensive.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 33, at 3 (“Large, economic reservoirs are 
rare and increasingly hard to find. . . . Drilling [producing wells] is by far the 
largest expense, running into the tens of millions of dollars per well.”). 
 45. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n, supra note 6, at 4–
5. 
 46. Id. at 5. 
 47. Id. at 7. 
 48. See Brown, supra note 33, at 3 n.2 (“The purpose of an exploratory well 
is to identify and evaluate potentially productive formations, whereas produc-
tion wells are optimized to extract petroleum most efficiently.”); see also Brief 
of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n, supra note 6, at 22 (describing a well 
that was abandoned after performing the DFIT). 
 49. See generally Brown, supra note 33, at 8–10 (explaining the completion 
process in detail). 
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clock, with operating costs of $50,000 to $70,000 a day.50 During 
this step, horizontal wells can be drilled off of the main vertical 
one51 and “well completion treatments,” like fracking, acidizing, 
and other forms of chemical stimulation, can be used.52 This pro-
duction period brings the gas to the surface. But, coming up 
alongside the gas is “produced water”—an estimated 858 billion 
gallons each year.53 
This produced water, or wastewater, presents its own prob-
lems to drilling operators. Such water is contaminated not only 
with petroleum, but with the chemicals that went into the well 
during the fracking process, as well as heavy metals from be-
neath the earth’s surface.54 Operators employ various methods 
to deal with it; the most common are: (1) shooting it back under-
ground into “injection wells”;55 (2) putting it in “evaporation 
ponds”;56 or (3) reusing it for additional fracking.57 If they choose 
injection wells, operators must survey the sites carefully to en-
sure that the pressurized waste does not find its way to the sur-
face again.58 They must truck the wastewater from the fracking 
 
 50. Mike Hughlett, North Dakota Oil Industry Shows Signs of a Rebound, 
STAR TRIB. (June 3, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/north-dakota-oil 
-industry-shows-signs-of-a-rebound/426170091. 
 51. See id. (“Each of the . . . wells will reach down 2 miles, then veer hori-
zontally for another 2 miles, the signature pattern of shale oil fracking.”). 
 52. Brief of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n, supra note 6, at 9. 
 53. Jonathan Thompson, Oil Gas and Water Use: The Real Issues, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.hcn.org/blogs/goat/oil-and-gas 
-water-use-the-real-issues. 
 54. Id. (“[Produced water] can be naturally tainted by . . . arsenic, a smor-
gasbord of heavy metals and even radiation.”). 
 55. For a discussion of this process, see O’REILLY, supra note 14, § 6:16 (“An 
injection well for driller wastes is basically a long vertical pipe with 24/7 diesel 
pumps pushing downward relentlessly.”). 
 56. See David Hasemyer, Open Pits Offer Cheap Disposal for Fracking 
Sludge, but Health Worries Mount, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 2, 2014), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/10/02/15826/open-pits-offer-cheap 
-disposal-fracking-sludge-health-worries-mount (“A handful of states . . . allow 
[wastewater] to be stored in open-air pits, called evaporation ponds[,] . . . where 
it remains until it becomes a gooey sludge the consistency of cake batter. Then 
it might be spread on open plots of land . . . [o]r it might remain in the pits until 
they are filled and covered with dirt for permanent storage. Some waste may 
also be mixed with asphalt and used to pave roads.”). 
 57. See id. (“After as much oil and gas as possible is removed from the wa-
ter, it’s . . . used to frack new wells.”); Thompson, supra note 53 (mentioning 
that some of the wastewater is recycled and used for irrigation). But see 
O’REILLY, supra note 14, § 6:16 (“Because of radium-226 and other radioactive 
components deep in the shale layer, this liquid waste cannot readily be intro-
duced into any useful on-surface water use.”). 
 58. See O’REILLY, supra note 14, § 6:16. 
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site to the site of the injection well—which may or may not be 
nearby.59 Wastewater spills from trucking accidents can contam-
inate other water sources.60 Operators using evaporation pits 
must figure out what to do with the toxic sludge that remains in 
the pits after the liquid has evaporated, which totals roughly 1.2 
barrels of solid waste for each foot drilled.61 Some, though not 
all, states require that evaporation pits be lined with material to 
prevent seepage.62 If operators wish to reuse the wastewater, 
they can implement on-site recycling technology.63 This may be 
cost-effective if the region has few injection wells.64 Another re-
use alternative is having the wastewater processed at a waste 
treatment facility which then “dump[s] the ‘clean’ water into a 
nearby sewer or river.”65 Wastewater contains radioactive com-
ponents.66 The treated effluent and other byproducts are less ra-
dioactive than before treatment, but they are still radioactive.67 
Of course, the cheapest and simplest way to get rid of produced 
water is to dump it on adjacent agricultural land.68 The quantity 
of wastewater can vary widely from one location to another—for 
 
 59. Nichola Groom, Fracking Water ’s Dirty Secret—Recycling, SCI. AM., 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/analysis-fracking-waters-dirty 
-secret (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 60. See, e.g., Laura Arenschield, Truck Overturns, Spills Drilling 
Wastewater That Taints Reservoir, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar. 9, 2016), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2016/03/09/Fracking-wastewater 
-shuts-down-reservoir.html. 
 61. ICF CONSULTING, OVERVIEW OF EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 
WASTE VOLUMES AND WASTE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 
22 (2000), http://www.api.org/~/media/files/ehs/environmental_performance/ 
icf-waste-survey-of-eandp-wastes-2000.pdf. 
 62. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-156, ENERGY-WATER 
NEXUS: INFORMATION ON THE QUANTITY, QUALITY, AND MANAGEMENT OF WA-
TER PRODUCED DURING OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION 28 (2012), http://www.gao 
.gov/assets/590/587522.pdf (noting that Colorado generally does not require lin-
ing but Wyoming does). 
 63. See Groom, supra note 59. 
 64. Id. For example, the geology of the Marcellus Shale region in Pennsyl-
vania makes injection wells less feasible there. Id. For that reason, the Marcel-
lus Shale region reuses seventy percent of its wastewater. Bill Chameides, 
Fracking Water: It’s Just So Hard To Clean, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC: THE GREAT 
ENERGY CHALLENGE (Oct. 4, 2013), http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/ 
2013/10/04/fracking-water-its-just-so-hard-to-clean. 
 65. Chameides, supra note 64. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Roy L. Hales, We Are Eating Drilling & Fracking Waste, THE ECORE-
PORT (May 13, 2015), http://theecoreport.com/we-are-eating-drilling-fracking 
-waste. 
 352 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:343 
 
example, wells in parts of Montana produce, on average, sixteen 
times more water than similar wells in parts of Colorado.69 
A producing well will be abandoned when it is no longer ac-
tive enough to be profitable.70 In the absence of a strict regula-
tory regime, companies are often able to leave the wellhead site 
behind without spending much money on waste site remedia-
tion.71 There is little requirement for companies to develop rec-
lamation plans for the wellhead sites, and even less ability to 
enforce such plans at either the federal or the state level.72 This 
means that certain aspects of drilling, like the wastewater and 
its associated sludge, could remain a threat long after the well 
has been abandoned.73 The following Subsection addresses how 
this threat affects the health of humans and the environment. 
2. Potential Hazards for Human and Environmental Health 
As mentioned in the previous Subsection, numerous toxic 
inputs and byproducts are an inherent part of the fracking pro-
cess. These byproducts can have a negative impact on the health 
of various species who happen to be living nearby,74 including 
humans. Oil and gas operations pollute the air with more than 
nine million tons of methane and other chemicals each year.75 
This has contributed to an increase in asthma, especially among 
children and the elderly76—which is disturbing, since 650,000 
 
 69. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 62, at 11. 
 70. See O’REILLY, supra note 14, § 6:16. However, it may not be abandoned 
forever; new fracking techniques could allow companies to refracture the same 
wells at a later date. See Amy Dalrymple, New Technology Could Recover More 
Oil from Early Bakken Wells, BISMARCK TRIB. (June 11, 2017) http:// 
bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/new-technology-could-recover 
-more-oil-from-early-bakken-wells/article_13e7bb72-0e71-51dc-a503 
-f71e69f60d40.html. 
 71. See O’REILLY, supra note 14, § 8.1. 
 72. See id. § 15.1. 
 73. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 62, at 29 (not-
ing that fish and aquatic species can be harmed when wastewater is not 
properly treated). 
 74. For example, greater sage grouse populations have been found to de-
cline fourteen percent each year in densely drilled areas. Matthew Brown, Re-
searchers: Limits on Drilling Not Enough To Protect Bird, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 19, 
2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/news/articles/2016-10-19/researchers 
-limits-on-drilling-not-enough-to-protect-bird. 
 75. LESLEY FLEISCHMAN ET AL., CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, GASPING FOR 
BREATH: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HEALTH EFFECTS FROM OZONE POLLUTION FROM 
THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 4 (Aug. 2016), http://www.catf.us/resources/ 
publications/files/Gasping_for_Breath.pdf. 
 76. Id. 
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school children live within a mile of a production well.77 Such 
pollution might result in hefty fines for the oil producers, but the 
damage will have already been done.78 Additionally, bits of the 
sand required for fracking can lodge themselves in the lungs of 
workers and lead to silicosis or cancer.79 A recent study found 
that even the noise from oil and gas operations can be linked to 
problems with cardiovascular health, like elevated blood pres-
sure and heart disease.80 
Contaminated wastewater produces its own hazards.81 The 
wastewater pumped into underground injection sites can find its 
way back to surface waters82 and contaminate drinking water.83 
 
 77. ELIZABETH RIDLINGTON ET AL., DANGEROUS AND CLOSE: FRACKING 
PUTS THE NATION’S MOST VULNERABLE PEOPLE AT RISK 4 (2016), https://www 
.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/EA_dangerous_scrn 
.pdf (“More than 650,000 kindergarten through twelfth grade children attend 
school within one mile of a fracked well.”). Not all lawmakers are concerned by 
this proximity. See, e.g., Colorado Lawmakers Kill Bill on Energy Drilling Near 
Schools, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/ 
colorado/articles/2017-04-12/colorado-lawmakers-kill-bill-on-energy-drilling 
-near-schools (“Urged on by industry and business groups, a Republican-led 
Senate committee voted along party lines Wednesday to defeat a proposal to 
extend the required distance between Colorado’s school and its oil and gas 
wells.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Potentially Steep Pollution Fines for Colorado Oil Producer, 
NEWSOK (June 26, 2017), http://www.newsok.com/potentially-steep-pollution 
-fines-for-colorado-oil-producer/article/feed/1285424 (“[EPA and Colorado regu-
lators] seek more than $100,000 a day in fines for problems they say occurred 
over several years.”). 
 79. See Nell Greenfieldboyce, Sand from Fracking Could Pose Lung Disease 
Risk to Workers, NPR (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/ 
2013/03/29/175042708/Sand-From-Fracking-Operations-Poses-Silicosis-Risk. 
 80. See Katie Herzog, Fracking Causes Noise Pollution That Could Be 
Harmful to Your Health, GRIST (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.grist.org/briefly/ 
fracking-causes-noise-pollution-that-could-be-harmful-to-your-health (“Frack-
ing operations can produce everything from a low rumble to loud drilling 
noises.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Susan Phillips, Study: Fracking Didn’t Impact West Virginia 
Groundwater, but Wastewater Spills Pollute Streams, NPR: STATEIMPACT (Apr. 
24, 2017), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2017/04/24/study-fracking 
-didnt-impact-west-virginia-groundwater-but-wastewater-spills-pollute 
-streams (“[S]pill water associated with fracked wells and their wastewater has 
an impact on the quality of streams in areas of intense shale gas development.”). 
 82. Evidence of Unconventional Oil and Gas Wastewater Found in Surface 
Waters near Underground Injection Site, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (May 9, 2016), 
http://www.usgs.gov/news/evidence-unconventional-oil-and-gas-wastewater 
-found-surface-waters-near-underground-injection. 
 83. See Coral Davenport, Reversing Course, EPA Says Fracking Can Con-
taminate Drinking Water, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/12/13/us/reversing-course-epa-says-fracking-can-contaminate-drinking 
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The harms do not end there. Evaporation pits “beckon water-lov-
ing birds” and kill at least half a million of them each year.84 
Surface wastewater spills can contaminate not only the soils, but 
also nearby streams.85 Radioactive substances found in the 
fracking wastewater, like selenium and radium, can linger in the 
environment for millennia if robust clean-up operations are not 
implemented.86 The same is true for the radioactive substances 
found in the solid waste of evaporation pits.87 Other chemicals, 
like the BTEX group associated with oil and gas production (ben-
zene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene), are thought to have en-
docrine-disrupting effects even at low exposure levels.88 The en-
docrine system controls numerous vital systems, and is thus 
important in every stage of a human’s life.89 Equally alarming, 
the federal government tends to “consider the chemicals safe un-
less they are proven to be harmful.”90 Therefore, chemicals used 
in fracking are not thoroughly tested for, say, those endocrine-
disrupting effects before being widely used on the market.91 
 
-water.html (“[T]he new report found evidence that fracking has contributed to 
drinking water contamination in all stages of the process . . . .”). 
 84. Thompson, supra note 53. 
 85. See Sharon Kelly, Duke Study Finds a “Legacy of Radioactivity,” Con-
tamination from Thousands of Fracking Wastewater Spills, DESMOG (May 8, 
2016), http://www.desmogblog.com/2016/05/08/duke-university-study-finds 
-legacy-radioactivity-water-and-soil-contaminated-thousands-fracking 
-wastewater-spills. 
 86. Id. (describing surface water contamination by wastewater to be “wide-
spread and persistent, with clear evidence of direct water contamination from 
fracking” in North Dakota). 
 87. For example, in 2016 North Dakota found illegal radioactive material 
in the landfills of three different oil field waste operators. See Lauren Donovan, 
Department Tightens Up on Radioactive Waste, BISMARCK TRIB. (Oct. 19, 2016), 
http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/department-tightens 
-up-on-radioactive-waste/article_c67b2e5f-b1ea-5a05-8157-665e6f295612.html. 
 88. See Ashley L. Bolden et al., New Look at BTEX: Are Ambient Levels a 
Problem?, 49 ENVIRON. SCI. & TECH. 5261, 5270 (2015). 
 89. See Endocrine Disruption Fact Sheet, TEDX (Nov. 7, 2011), https://www 
.endocrinedisruption.org/assets/media/documents/EDFactSheet11-7-11.pdf 
(“[Endocrine disrupting chemicals] have been implicated in neurological dis-
eases, reproductive disorders, thyroid dysfunction, immune and metabolic dis-
orders and more.”). 
 90. Charles Lewis, Foreword to DAN FAGIN & MARIANNE LAVELLE, TOXIC 
DECEPTION: HOW THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MANIPULATES SCIENCE, BENDS THE 
LAW, AND ENDANGERS YOUR HEALTH, at vii, x (1996). 
 91. See TEDx Talks, Letter to the President About Chemicals Disrupting 
Our Bodies: Theo Colborn at TEDxMidAtlantic 2012, YOUTUBE (April 12, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2r2Rx8VRq48 (“Chemicals are now in wide 
use that were never tested using assays that can detect disturbances in the 
womb that eventually lead to diseases that might not appear until puberty or 
even later in life . . . . Our laws have let this happen.”). 
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Meanwhile, spills can occur at as many as sixteen percent of the 
fracked wells each year.92 
While the detrimental effects on environmental and human 
health can be insidious, the seismic activity associated with 
wastewater injections has been more obvious.93 For example, 
Oklahoma experienced only nine earthquakes between 2004 and 
2008—just before the fracking boom began.94 In 2015 alone, it 
experienced nearly 900 earthquakes.95 Although most of those 
earthquakes are too small to cause property damage, some are 
stronger.96 A homeowner in Oklahoma received twelve stitches 
after her stone fireplace collapsed in an earthquake.97 Other 
Oklahomans filed a class action lawsuit for property damage and 
devaluation.98  
Other industry-related accidents might be fluky, but they 
could still be fatal for nearby property owners. In the spring of 
2017, a home exploded in Colorado, killing two people and criti-
cally injuring a third.99 Though fracking did not directly cause 
the explosion, oil and gas activity did: “odorless gas seeping from 
a cut-off underground pipeline,” a pipeline that had not been 
shut off or capped, entered the home and “found an ignition 
 
 92. Matt McGrath, Thousands of Spills at US Oil and Gas Fracking Sites, 
BBC (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-39032748. 
 93. In places where fracking wastewater is injected into the ground (as op-
posed to being dumped in an “evaporation pit”), there tends to be an increase in 
earthquakes. See James Conca, Thanks to Fracking, Earthquake Hazards in 
Parts of Oklahoma Now Comparable to California, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/09/07/the-connection-between 
-earthquakes-and-fracking; see also Kathiann M. Kowalski, While Cause Re-
mains Unclear, Earthquake Prompts New Look at Ohio Fracking, MIDWEST EN-
ERGY NEWS (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2017/04/07/ 
while-cause-remains-unclear-earthquake-prompts-new-look-at-ohio-fracking 
(describing a recent earthquake in Ohio within five miles of oil and gas extrac-
tion wells, with wastewater injection wells farther away). 
 94. David Wethe, Oil, Earthquakes and the Rush To Save Oklahoma, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2016-11-14/rare-oil-patch-hot-spot-emerges-in-america-s-earthquake-capital. 
 95. Anna Kuchment, Drilling-Induced Earthquakes May Endanger Mil-
lions in 2016, USGS Says, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.pbs 
.org/newshour/updates/drilling-induced-earthquakes-may-endanger-millions 
-in-2016-usgs-says. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Residents File Class-Action Suit over Man-Made Earthquakes, 
NEWSOK (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.newsok.com/article/5527594. 
 99. Aldo Svaldi, After Fatal House Explosion, Anadarko Petroleum To Shut 
Down 3,000 Wells in Northeastern Colorado, DENV. POST (Apr. 26, 2017), http:// 
www.denverpost.com/2017/04/26/anadarko-petroleum-shut-down-3000-wells 
-after-house-explosion. 
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source.”100 The incident appears to be an anomaly.101 Still, it sug-
gests that older, vertical wells can pose a threat to public health 
whether they are in active use or not.102 
This litany of threats to human and environmental health 
prompts several questions: What can local community members 
do when a petroleum operator wants to drill nearby? To what 
extent can and should concerned citizens be involved in the per-
mitting process? Who is charged with making the ultimate deci-
sion whether or not to allow drilling near a particular commu-
nity? Are public health officials consulted? Section B addresses 
these questions. 
B. A COMPARISON OF STATE-LEVEL OIL AND GAS BOARDS 
Decisions surrounding the permitting of drilling for onshore 
petroleum on private land primarily fall under the jurisdiction 
of states and tribes, rather than the federal government.103 In 
turn, these states charge their relevant state-level agencies with 
all management decisions. The procedures governing each 
state’s oil and gas board will vary depending on its enabling act. 
The size of the board, its composition, and the requirements for 
hearing and notice all vary widely from state to state. This Sec-
tion compares the approaches taken by ten petroleum-producing 
states.104 Montana and Colorado are useful case studies: the for-
mer has an unusually robust hearing and notice regime, while 
 
 100. Bruce Finley, Deadly Firestone Explosion Caused by Odorless Gas Leak-
ing from Cut Gas Flow Pipeline, DENV. POST (May 2, 2017), http://www 
.denverpost.com/2017/05/02/firestone-explosion-cause-cut-gas-line. 
 101. Bruce Finley, Severed Gas Line Is Blamed for Fatal Explosion; Colorado 
Orders Thousands of Wells, Miles of Pipeline Inspected, DENV. POST (May 2, 
2017), http://www.denverpost.com/2017/05/02/firestone-explosion-oil-wells 
-pipelines-inspected (“In our experience, what has taken place here is highly 
unusual and required a confluence of a number of different events to come to 
pass . . . .”). 
 102. See Christopher N. Osher & Bruce Finley, Oil and Gas Industry Pipe-
line Problems Are Well-Established. Why Did It Take a Fatal Explosion To Spur 
Action?, DENV. POST (May 7, 2017), http://www.denverpost.com/2017/05/07/ 
firestone-explosion-raises-questions-pipeline-risks (“Broken underground pipe-
lines carrying oil or gas from wells to tanks and to other equipment in the field 
are the leading cause of hazardous oil and gas industry leaks . . . .”). 
 103. See Natural Gas Extraction – Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA, https://www 
.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 104. For a map of fracked wells across the United States, see, Competition 
for Water in US Shale Energy Development, CERES (2016), http://alpha 
.blueraster.io/ceres/www/index.html (depicting the parts of the United States 
affected by petroleum development, as well as the regional differences in water 
stress). 
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the latter includes a much wider variety of specialists as voting 
board members.105 Because these procedures help keep the pub-
lic informed and, arguably, safer, the two states stand out among 
their peers who have no such procedures in place.106 
First, this Section briefly assesses the state-level adminis-
trative laws that govern oil and gas boards, including the general 
parameters of the hearing and notice requirements in Montana 
and Colorado. Next, it examines the oil and gas boards of Mon-
tana and Colorado in depth, comparing how the two states have 
approached the question of representation in the agencies, and 
to what extent the agencies include the public in the permit pro-
cess. Lastly, this Section compares the procedures in Montana 
and Colorado to those of eight other states, all of which have cho-
sen to regulate petroleum extraction differently. 
1. An Introduction to State-Level Agencies 
Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 
1946107 as a response to the proliferation of federal agencies dur-
ing President Roosevelt’s New Deal.108 The APA governs the 
rulemaking process of federal agencies and programs.109 Be-
cause the agencies use regulations to compel behavior in certain 
sectors, they possess the power to set “wide-ranging policies.”110 
The APA also addresses the judicial review available to individ-
uals who are adversely affected by agency actions and the issu-
ance of permits.111 To bolster the transparency of agency deci-
sions, Congress passed the Government in the Sunshine Act in 
1976.112 The Act declares that it is “the policy of the United 
 
 105. See generally infra Part I.B.2 (assessing in depth the oil and gas boards 
of Montana and Colorado). 
 106. See infra Table 1. 
 107. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012). 
 108. See Administrative Procedure Act, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, http:// 
www.foreffectivegov.org/node/226 (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. But cf. Rui J. P. De Figueiredo, Jr. & Richard G. Vanden Bergh, The 
Political Economy of State-Level Administrative Procedure Acts, 47 J.L. & ECON. 
569, 571 (2004) (“Despite the claim that APAs have a material effect on policy 
outcomes, scant empirical evidence demonstrates this.”). 
 111. Summary of the Administrative Procedure Act, EPA, https://www.epa 
.gov/laws-regulations/summary-administrative-procedure-act (last visited Oct. 
13, 2017). 
 112. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b. 
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States that the public is entitled to the fullest practicable infor-
mation regarding the decision making processes of the Federal 
Government.”113 
Over the course of forty years, all states enacted their own 
administrative laws regarding hearing and notice, both in the 
form of state-level APAs and as sunshine laws.114 The purposes 
of the state-level APAs tend to be similar to the federal version: 
(1) to “give notice to the public of governmental action and to 
provide for public participation in that action”; (2) to “establish 
general uniformity and due process safeguards in agency rule-
making”; and (3) to establish “judicial review of agency rules and 
final agency decisions.”115 Hearing and notice are important 
components of democratic systems.116 They function as a safe-
guard against unjustified deprivation—particularly the signifi-
cant deprivation of property.117 Notice is considered “[a]n ele-
mentary and fundamental requirement of due process” to let 
interested parties know about a relevant action and “afford them 
an opportunity to present their objections.”118 Notice must be 
provided in a way that allows all affected property owners to 
have actual notice.119 Hearings are necessary because “[p]arties 
whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard.”120 
Beyond these generalities, the rights of citizens to partici-
pate in agency decisions can be different from one state to the 
next. For example, the Montana open meeting law specifies a 
“liberal construction,” stating that “[t]he people of the state do 
not wish to abdicate their sovereignty to the agencies which 
 
 113. Id. § 2. 
 114. See Sarah Klaper, The Eye-Roll Heard ‘Round the World: Protecting Cit-
izens’ Free Speech and Petition Rights in Accessing Local Government, 10 
CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 299, 317 n.166 (2012). 
 115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-101(2)(a)–(c) (2015). 
 116. See id. § 2-4-601(1) (“[A]ll parties must be afforded an opportunity for 
hearing after reasonable notice.”); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(4)(a)–
(a.5) (2016) (requiring an “opportunity” to be heard). 
 117. See, e.g., Fritz v. Bd. of Trs., 252 N.E.2d 567, 572 (Ind. 1969) (“Fairness 
and justice require that [plaintiff ] should be given notice . . . to reasonably ap-
prise him of the fact that he and his property are involved [in an assessment] 
and that he be given an opportunity to resist the attempt of the public authori-
ties to enforce their will to take his property without an opportunity to be 
heard.”). 
 118. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 119. See, e.g., Meadowbrook Manor, Inc. v. City of St. Louis Park, 104 
N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1960) (“[M]ailed notice of special assessment hearings 
would satisfy due process because such notice is reasonably calculated to inform 
the taxpayer of the assessment hearing.”). 
 120. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863). 
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serve them.”121 Montana law requires posted notice only if the 
issue is “of significant interest to the public,” but that phrase has 
not been defined.122 
Similarly, Colorado courts interpret that state’s open meet-
ing laws broadly.123 Its statute states that “the formation of pub-
lic policy is public business and may not be conducted in se-
cret.”124 Notice of meetings in Colorado must be “full and 
timely.”125 “[F]ull and timely notice” is not defined,126 but has 
been interpreted as a flexible standard that balances the com-
peting interests of public participation and the agency’s ability 
to conduct business.127 
Like Montana and Colorado, all of the oil and gas boards 
discussed in this Note are governed by: (1) their respective 
state’s APA; (2) their respective state’s open meeting (or sun-
shine) laws; (3) the enabling act that sprang the agency into be-
ing; and (4) any additional regulations that the agency has 
adopted through its rulemaking procedures.128 With those con-
siderations in mind, the following Subsection embarks on an in-
depth comparison of the oil and gas agencies of Montana and 
Colorado.  
2. A Comparison of Oil and Gas Agencies in Montana and 
Colorado 
As discussed in the previous Subsection, the agencies 
charged with overseeing the onshore drilling permits for petro-
leum companies are state-level oil and gas boards. These can 
vary considerably from one state to the next, largely depending 
on how each state’s legislature has chosen to structure and em-
power the agency. This Subsection will contrast the approaches 
that Montana and Colorado have taken. 
 
 121. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-201. 
 122. Id. § 2-3-103(1)(a). 
 123. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 298 P.3d 
1027, 1029 (Colo. App. 2012). 
 124. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-401 (2016). 
 125. Id. § 24-6-402(2)(c). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Town of Marble v. Darien, 181 P.3d 1148, 1152 (Colo. 2008) (en banc). 
 128. See CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, supra note 108 (“The main require-
ments for informal rulemaking are: [p]ublication of a ‘Notice of Proposed Rule-
making’. . . [o]pportunity for public participation by submission of written com-
ments; [c]onsideration of the agency of the public comments . . . and 
[p]ublication of a final rule not less than 30 days before its effective date . . . .”). 
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a. Montana 
The Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation (the Board) 
has seven members.129 Three need to be from the oil and gas in-
dustry, with at least three years of experience in petroleum pro-
duction.130 Two must be unaffiliated with the industry, but be 
“landowners residing in oil or gas producing counties”—one who 
owns the property’s mineral rights, and the other who does 
not.131 One member must be an attorney.132 The Governor ap-
points four of the seven members at the time she takes office and 
appoints the others two years later, all for four-year terms.133 
The Board is primarily concerned with preventing waste of 
petroleum resources and conserving such resources “by encour-
aging maximum efficient recovery” of them.134 It also “seeks to 
prevent oil and gas operations from harming nearby land or un-
derground resources.”135 The Board oversees the permitting of 
not just exploratory and production wells, but also of injection 
and disposal wells.136 A separate division performs a technical 
review of a company’s injection well proposal to ensure that un-
derground sources of drinking water will not be at risk.137 This 
step includes a “public notice and hearing process.”138 The Board 
can then issue or deny the permit, or issue the permit with cer-
tain modifications.139 The jurisdiction of the Board extends eve-
rywhere in Montana other than tribal lands.140 
Across the state there have been 4000 to 7000 wells fracked 
in 132 different fields.141 The Board requires that petroleum 
drillers give public notice whenever an operator wishes to drill a 
 
 129. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-3303(2) (2015). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation, MONT. BD. OF OIL & GAS, 
http://www.bogc.dnrc.mt.gov/Boardsummaries.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Holly K. Michels, Companies Don’t Have To Disclose Fracking Chemi-
cals, but Lawsuit Wants To Change That, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Apr. 10, 2017), 
http://www.billingsgazette.com/news/government-and-politics/fracking-suit-on 
-hold-as-legislature-considers-change-to-disclosure/article_4cebbedf-8cda-53cc 
-ab4a-f2879fcc5051.html. 
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well outside of the existing fields.142 In line with Montana’s gen-
eral notice requirements, the applicant must publish a newspa-
per posting in Helena and the affected local county.143 A public 
hearing will be held if: (1) any interested person demands an op-
portunity to be heard; (2) the Board members think that the ap-
plicant is not in substantial compliance with Montana’s drilling 
rules; or (3) the drilling operations require further environmen-
tal review.144 At the hearing, the Board can grant or deny the 
permit, or can choose to impose other conditions it considers ap-
propriate.145 
These structural and procedural aspects of Montana’s Board 
share some overlap with Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission. However, in important respects, the two states di-
verge: Colorado’s Commission includes members who specialize 
in public and environmental health, and it provides an optional 
public forum instead of hearings. Colorado’s approach is consid-
ered next. 
b. Colorado 
The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (the 
Commission) oversees the vast petroleum activity within Colo-
rado’s borders.146 It has nine members: seven appointed by the 
Governor, along with the Executive Director of the Department 
of Natural Resources and the Executive Director of the Depart-
ment of Public Health and Environment.147 The two executive 
directors are ex officio voting members.148 Two members need to 
be from west of the continental divide; three must have “substan-
tial experience” in the petroleum industry; one must be a local 
government official; one needs “formal training or substantial 
experience in environmental or wildlife protection” and another 
in “soil conservation or reclamation”; and one should be “actively 
engaged in agricultural production.”149 Of the seven appointed 
 
 142. MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.601(1) (2017). 
 143. Id. at 36.22.601(1)(a). 
 144. Id. at 36.22.601(4)(a)–(c). 
 145. Id. at 36.22.601(5)(a)–(b). 
 146. For a map of all the wells in Colorado as of April 2017, including those 
that are active, abandoned, or injection wells, see Kevin Hamm, Here’s a Map 
of Every Oil and Gas Well in the State of Colorado, DENV. POST (May 1, 2017), 
http://www.denverpost.com/2017/05/01/oil-gas-wells-colorado-map. 
 147. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104(2)(a)(I) (2016). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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members, no more than four can be from the same political 
party.150 
The Commission’s purpose is to foster “the responsible de-
velopment of Colorado’s oil and gas natural resources in a man-
ner consistent with the protection of public health, safety, and 
welfare, including the environment and wildlife resources.”151 
The Commission must protect these public and private interests 
while not wasting Colorado’s petroleum resources.152 It also is 
required to recognize that the state’s wildlife and environment 
“are to be protected, preserved, enhanced, and managed for the 
use, benefit, and enjoyment of the people of this state.”153 
To ensure that public and environmental health are not im-
paired, Colorado includes an additional level of oversight in the 
permit process. Local governments can appoint a designee to 
consult with the permit applicant and Commission Director 
about the proposed permit to drill.154 They can also ask the Col-
orado Department of Public Health and Environment to assess 
the proposal.155 Colorado Parks and Wildlife must also be con-
sulted by the Commission in certain circumstances when per-
mits are granted or modified.156 Any person can also file a re-
quest to be automatically notified by mail about any proceeding 
that will take place in front of the Commission.157 
When a hearing occurs, the Commission must publish a 
newspaper posting in Denver and the local county in which the 
affected land is situated.158 Notice of a hearing must also be 
mailed directly to the last known mailing address of the person 
to be given notice or personally served.159 Notice is given to the 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, http://cogcc.state.co.us/#/ 
home (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). The Colorado Court of Appeals recently de-
cided that “the clear language” of the Commission’s enabling legislation does 
not support the typical balancing test of industry interests against public 
health. Rather, it is a mandate that oil and gas exploration in Colorado “be reg-
ulated subject to the protection of public health . . . including protection of the 
environment and wildlife resources.” Martinez v. Colo. Oil & Gas Comm’n, No. 
16CA0564, 2017 WL 1089556, at *7 (Colo. App. Mar. 23, 2017). 
 152. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(II). 
 153. Id. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(IV). See also Colorado Habitat Stewardship Act of 
2007, id. § 34-60-128. 
 154. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:306.b(1) (2017). 
 155. Id. § 404-1:306.b(2). 
 156. Id. § 404-1:306.c. 
 157. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-108(5). 
 158. Id. § 34-60-108(4). 
 159. Id. 
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appropriate parties at least thirty-five days in advance and is 
paid for by the applicant.160 Who is considered an appropriate 
party depends on the particular application; for example, notice 
of applications affecting other drilling units must be served on 
the owners of those units.161 
In addition to the limited use of hearings, an application 
that would result in too much well density can trigger a local 
public forum.162 Notice of local public forums is mailed to all of 
“the surface owners within the application area” at least twenty-
one days before the forum date.163 It is also posted in local news-
papers fourteen days before the forum date.164 The purpose of 
such forums is to make sure the proposed plan to increase well 
density will not endanger “public health, safety, and welfare, in-
cluding the environment and wildlife resources.”165 The ultimate 
result of the public forum is a report that the Commission uses 
in its consideration of the application.166 
3. How Other States Design and Empower Their Oil and Gas 
Boards 
The previous Subsection presented a detailed view of how 
Montana and Colorado designed and empowered their respective 
oil and gas boards. This Subsection assesses those agencies 
throughout the country. How do other states approach the notice 
and hearing requirements surrounding drilling permits? Who 
must be represented in their agencies? These questions are ad-
dressed by briefly considering the oil and gas boards of eight ad-
ditional states with petroleum reserves: Arkansas, New York, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyo-
ming.167 These states were chosen for geographical diversity and 
for diversity in their approach to the permit process.168 
 
 160. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:507(a). 
 161. See id. § 404-1:507(b). 
 162. See id. § 404-1:508(b)(2) (specifying that a public forum could be con-
vened on a motion from the Commission, the Director, the Local Government 
Designee, the applicant, or upon request from a citizen of the county to be af-
fected by the application). 
 163. Id. § 404-1:508(d)(1)–(2). 
 164. Id. § 404-1:508(d)(4). 
 165. Id. § 404-1:508(f )(1); see also id. § 404-1:508(g) (requiring that forum 
participants be allowed to make statements relating to “public health, safety, 
and welfare”). 
 166. Id. § 404-1:508(h). 
 167. For an overview of the differences, see Table 1. 
 168. For a comparison of how much natural gas these states produce, see 
Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
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Table 1: Comparison of Oil and Gas Agencies in Ten 
States169 
 
Arkansas’s nine commissioners are appointed by the Gover-
nor, “at least a majority of whom shall be experienced in the de-
velopment, production, or transportation of oil or gas.”170 Arkan-
sas requires public notice in a local newspaper for proposed 
injection wells,171 but only requires notice by certified mail to 
surface owners for proposed exploratory wells.172 New York sim-
ilarly requires notice by certified mail to “any landowner whose 
surface rights will be affected by drilling operations” as well as 
 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dc_NUS_mmcf_m.htm (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2017). 
 169. For the citations supporting the entries in this table, refer to Appendix 
following this Note. 
 170. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-71-102(a)–(b) (2017). 
 171. ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N, GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, RULE H-
1 CLASS II DISPOSAL AND CLASS II COMMERCIAL DISPOSAL WELL PERMIT APPLI-
CATION PROCEDURES 198 (2017), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/rules/rulesregs 
.pdf. 
 172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-203(b). “After written notice of the operator ’s 
intent to begin shale operations is given under this subsection, an operator is 
not required to give any other notice to begin, conduct, or complete shale oper-
ations on the surface owner ’s property.” Id. § 15-72-203(c)(4). 
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“to any local government affected of [sic] the location of the drill-
ing site.”173 Despite having access to the petroleum reserves 
within the Marcelles Shale formation, New York banned frack-
ing in 2015.174 Its Division of Mineral Resources, within the De-
partment of Environmental Conservation, still oversees permit 
requests for oil and gas wells not implementing the high-volume 
fracking techniques.175 The civil servants who oversee these per-
mit requests likely have backgrounds in petroleum or geology.176 
Like New York, Pennsylvania handles its permit requests 
through its Department of Environmental Protection, rather 
than an appointed board.177 It allows landowners or any “af-
fected person suffering pollution or diminution of a water supply 
as a result of drilling” to request that the Department conduct 
an investigation.178 The Department publishes a notice when it 
issues or amends a general water quality management per-
mit,179 but does not publish any notice for a general drilling per-
mit.180 As for its fracking wastewater, Pennsylvania prefers to 
send it to Ohio’s injection wells, rather than operate its own in-
jection wells.181 
 
 173. N.Y. ENVT’L. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0305 (McKinney 2017). 
 174. See New York and Fracking, EARTHJUSTICE, http://www.earthjustice 
.org/features/new-york-and-fracking (last visited Oct. 13, 2017); see also N.Y. 
DEP’T OF ENV. CONSERVATION, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY 
PROGRAM 42 (2015), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ 
findingstatehvhf62015.pdf (“[T]here are no feasible or prudent alternatives that 
would adequately avoid or minimize adverse environmental impacts and that 
address the scientific uncertainties and risks to public health from [high-volume 
hydraulic fracturing].”). 
 175. See Division of Mineral Resources, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVA-
TION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/about/636.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 176. See Email from Thomas E. Noll, Director, Bureau of Oil & Gas Permit-
ting & Mgmt., N.Y. Div. of Mineral Res., to author (Mar. 17, 2017, 09:35 CDT) 
(on file with author). 
 177. See Office of Oil and Gas Management, PENN. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., 
http://www.dep.pa.gov/business/energy/oilandgasprograms/oilandgasmgmt/ 
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 178. 25 PA. CODE § 78.51(b) (2017). 
 179. Id. § 91.27(b)(1). 
 180. See id. §§ 78.11–.15. 
 181. See Kathiann M. Kowalski, Fracking Wastewater Is Big Business in 
Ohio, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (July 18, 2014), http://www.midwestenergynews 
.com/2014/07/18/fracking-wastewater-is-big-business-in-ohio (“[Ohio] now has 
more than 200 active injection wells for oil and gas waste . . . . In contrast, only 
seven injection wells were active in neighboring Pennsylvania, which sends mil-
lions of gallons of its fracked wells’ wastewater to Ohio.”). Pennsylvania also 
recycles its flowback water and operates a few injection wells within its borders. 
See Marie Cusick, Pennsylvania OKs New Injection Wells for Oil and Gas 
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The five members of Ohio’s Oil and Gas Commission are ap-
pointed by the Governor.182 One must represent “a major petro-
leum company”; one must represent “the public”; one must rep-
resent “independent petroleum operators”; one must be 
“experienced in oil and gas law”; and one must be “experienced 
in geology or petroleum engineering.”183 No more than three can 
be of the same political party.184 When drilling a well “within an 
urbanized area,” applicants must provide notice to property own-
ers within 500 feet of the potential well,185 who in turn must no-
tify each residence within that property.186 Drilling lease pro-
posals do not mandate a public hearing.187 However, proposals 
to drill in “urbanized area[s]” do trigger a public meeting for 
which those same nearby property owners receive notice.188 
North Dakota’s Industrial Commission includes the Gover-
nor, the Attorney General, and the Agriculture Commissioner.189 
Among other things, this Commission oversees and regulates the 
oil and gas industry in North Dakota.190 Permits are conducted 
through a subsidiary body, the Oil and Gas Division,191 whose 
director is appointed by the Commission.192 North Dakota re-
quires that an exploration permit applicant provide a copy of the 
relevant statutes to both the surface owner and to landowners 
within a half mile of the proposed exploration area.193 
Oklahoma’s drilling operations are overseen by the elected 
three-member Oklahoma Corporation Commission, who also 
oversee public utilities, trucking, and railroad crossings.194 The 
Oklahoma Constitution specifies that none of the Commission 
members shall have any interests in various transportation and 
 
Wastewater, NPR: STATEIMPACT (Mar. 27, 2017), https://stateimpact.npr.org/ 
pennsylvania/2017/03/27/pennsylvania-oks-new-injection-wells-for-oil-and-gas 
-wastewater. 
 182. OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.35(A) (2017). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. § 1509.06(A)(9). 
 186. Id. § 1509.60. 
 187. See id. § 1509.06. 
 188. Id. § 1509.61(A). 
 189. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-17-02 (2017). 
 190. Id. § 38-08-04. 
 191. Id. § 38-08.1-04.1(3). 
 192. See North Dakota Industrial Commission, N.D. STATE GOV’T, http:// 
www.nd.gov/ndic/ic-about.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 193. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08.1-04.1(4). 
 194. See Oklahoma Corporation Commission History, OKLA. CORP. COMM’N, 
http://www.occeweb.com/Comm/commissionhist.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
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communication companies, but does not include the oil and gas 
industry.195 It is also permissible for Commissioners to accept 
personal financial contributions from the oil and gas industry.196 
Oklahoma requires notice to the public: (1) when drilling opera-
tors request an injection well permit;197 and (2) when drilling op-
erators submit a remediation proposal for a particular site.198 
Texas parallels Oklahoma in its Railroad Commission (the 
entity in charge of oil and natural gas in that state): three elected 
members make up the Commission.199 Wyoming, on the other 
hand, parallels North Dakota by having its governor as a mem-
ber of the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.200 The Director 
of the Office of State Lands and Investments and the State Ge-
ologist also each serve as members, along with two “additional 
members from the public at large . . . qualified to serve the oil 
and gas industry of this state,” who are appointed by the Gover-
nor.201 
Ultimately, the decision-making structure surrounding 
whether to issue a drilling permit can vary greatly from state to 
state. Part I presented an overview of the inherent complications 
when balancing petroleum production and its waste products 
with the interests of adjacent property owners and community 
members. The state-level agencies in charge of permitting and 
other regulatory decisions must tread carefully between repre-
senting the health concerns of local community members and be-
tween encouraging the business interests of their state. The next 
Part addresses this problem. 
 
 195. OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 16. 
 196. One recently elected member of the Commission received nearly 
$80,000 in donations within a two-month period of his election to help pay off 
his campaign loan—donations “mostly from donors in the oil and gas industry.” 
See Nolan Clay, New Oklahoma Corporation Commissioner Collects Enough To 
Pay Off $200,000 Campaign Loan, NEWSOK (May 2, 2015), http://www.newsok 
.com/article/5415674. 
 197. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-5-5(d)–(e) (2016). 
 198. Id. § 165:10-10-10. Depending on the interest such notice generates, a 
public meeting may follow. Id. 
 199. See Commissioners, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/ 
about-us/commissioners (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 200. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-103(a) (2017). 
 201. Id. 
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II.  THE CURRENT HEARING AND NOTICE REGIME DOES 
NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT COMMUNITIES NEAR 
DRILLING OPERATIONS   
The states surveyed in Part I attempted to design oil and 
gas boards in a way that serves both of the competing interests 
discussed above—some states more successfully than others. 
Montana’s Board and Colorado’s Commission stand out for offer-
ing more safeguards to the public, both procedurally (through a 
hearing and notice regime) or structurally (by mandating a more 
diverse board) than other states. But even in those two states, 
the oil and gas boards can fall short of adequately protecting the 
interests of communities near drilling operations. Part II of this 
Note assesses these shortcomings. 
First, this Part considers the longstanding tension between 
the petroleum industry’s interest in efficiency and the public’s 
interest in health and safety. It then discusses the approaches 
Montana, Colorado, and other states have taken to ameliorate 
this tension. Finally, this Part considers the implications of the 
makeup of oil and gas boards—that is, (1) how many members 
should be represented in such agencies; (2) the necessary char-
acteristics of those members; and (3) whether those members are 
elected or appointed. 
A. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY’S 
INTEREST IN EFFICIENCY AND THE PUBLIC’S INTEREST IN 
HEALTH AND SAFETY 
Like most business ventures, the petroleum industry does 
not want a regulatory regime that would likely result in delay 
and excessive costs.202 The rationale tends to be: if there are un-
calculated delays and excessive costs, then general uncertainty 
will inhibit the number of wells that can be drilled; this will 
lessen that company’s impact in a given state; and that will in 
turn hurt that state’s tax revenue, its employment, and its 
schools.203 In other words, it is thought to be in the best interest 
of a state’s citizens for the companies to drill without excessive 
public hearing and notice requirements—or much involvement 
from the public at all. The result is a “regulatory vacuum” within 
the oil and gas industry.204 
 
 202. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n, supra note 6, at 3. 
 203. Id. at 5. 
 204. See, e.g., Whaley & Ingold, supra note 8. 
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When an interested group wants to minimize the dangers of 
fracking, they sometimes limit “fracking” to the initial steps of 
drilling, and ignore wastewater issues.205 The evidence linking 
public health problems and the first step of fracking is sparse.206 
If that were the only safety concern associated with drilling, then 
perhaps the industry would be right to argue for less oversight. 
However, the documented public health danger lies not only in 
the first step of fracking, but also in the related air pollution, in 
the specks of fracking sand lodging themselves in workers’ lungs, 
and in the millions of gallons of associated wastewaters.207 The 
danger lies in the endocrine-disrupting chemicals found in the 
wastewater that were never thoroughly tested before being 
widely used by the industry.208 It lies in the pressing possibility 
that another wastewater-induced earthquake will rattle some-
one’s Oklahoma house, damaging the property and perhaps 
hurting those inside.209 It lies in the fact that someone near a 
drilling operation must endure regular ozone alerts to know 
whether it is safe to be outside that day210 or perhaps always 
wear an oxygen mask outside, just to err on the side of caution.211 
 
 205. Seamus McGraw, Is Fracking Safe? The Ten Most Controversial Claims 
About Natural Gas Drilling, POPULAR MECHANICS (May 1, 2016), http://www 
.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/g161/top-10-myths-about-natural-gas 
-drilling-6386593 (stating that it is unlikely that the fluids injected during the 
initial high-volume fracking would migrate into groundwater, without mention-
ing the potential for wastewater spills during a subsequent step of the process). 
 206. See, e.g., Induced Earthquakes: Myths and Misconceptions, U.S. GEO-
LOGICAL SURV., https://earthquake.usgs.gov/research/induced/myths.php (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2017) (“Fracking is NOT causing most of the induced earth-
quakes. Wastewater disposal is the primary cause of the recent increase in 
earthquakes in the central United States.”). But cf. Fracking, FOOD & WATER 
WATCH, https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/problems/fracking (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2017) (“The entire fracking process—from drilling a well to dealing with 
the resulting toxic waste—endangers our water and the health of our commu-
nities.”). 
 207. See supra text accompanying notes 75–85. 
 208. See supra text accompanying notes 88–91. 
 209. See supra text accompanying notes 93–98. 
 210. See Ann Chambers Noble, The Jonah Field and Pinedale Anticline: A 
Natural-Gas Success Story, WYOHISTORY.ORG, http://www.wyohistory.org/ 
encyclopedia/jonah-field-and-pinedale-anticline-natural-gas-success-story (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2017) (“Air pollution is now a way of life. . . . High ozone levels 
can be particularly dangerous to people with compromised immune systems and 
respiratory problems.”). 
 211. See Abrahm Lustgarten & Nicholas Kusnetz, Science Lags as Health 
Problems Emerge near Gas Fields, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 16, 2011), https://www 
.propublica.org/article/science-lags-as-health-problems-emerge-near-gas-fields 
(“I took to wearing a respirator and swim goggles outside to tend to my ani-
mals.”). 
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It lies in the nerve damage and in the loss of the ability to taste 
and smell.212 
The industry’s response to such allegations tends to be one 
of diminishment or obfuscation. Because many protesters also 
mistakenly associate the first step of fracking with the subse-
quent health dangers, the industry can respond by marshalling 
evidence that this step played no role.213 A common focal point 
for both sides tends to be whether fracking has or has not con-
taminated drinking water.214 This is an important question, es-
pecially after the Environmental Protection Agency’s recent re-
versal on the question.215 But, that debate can be an unfortunate 
diversion from holding the industry responsible for the broader 
health and safety hazards that its drilling practices have been 
proven to cause. 
Another common counterargument to fracking’s harms 
tends to focus on its ability to help the United States achieve 
energy independence.216 The United States can “leverage its 
abundant natural gas reserves as a transitional bridge” to re-
newable energy, which makes sense since everyone “want[s] the 
most bang for their buck.”217 And, besides, fracking advocates 
argue, since there are very real “environmental and health ben-
efits of natural gas over other fossil fuels,”218 the United States 
ought to incentivize oil and gas operators to drill as much as pos-
sible. Such arguments are likely similarly put forth by members 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n, supra note 6, at 21 
(“[T]here have been several highly-publicized cases involving allegations that 
fracing [sic] was responsible for well contamination or other environmental 
harm. . . . Even the most publicized allegations, however, have proven greatly 
exaggerated or false under further scrutiny.”). 
 214. See id. at 22. 
 215. Davenport, supra note 83 (reporting that the EPA has found evidence 
that fracking does contribute to drinking water contamination). 
 216. See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 9, at 157–64. 
 217. Barry Stevens, The Benefits of Shale Gas Far Outweigh the Negatives 
of Fracking, OILPRICE.COM (Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.oilprice.com/Energy/ 
Natural-Gas/The-Benefits-Of-Shale-Gas-Far-Outweigh-The-Negatives-Of 
-Fracking.html. For example, the city of Duluth, Minnesota, is converting a 
downtown steam plant from coal to natural gas, and later to “utilize other en-
ergy sources to heat the water, including solar and biomass.” Dan Kraker, Du-
luth Launches Coal-Cutting Energy Pilot, MPRNEWS (Apr. 12, 2017), https:// 
www.mprnews.org/story/2017/04/12/duluth-launches-coalcutting-energy-pilot. 
 218. See Stevens, supra note 217. 
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of oil and gas boards who favor deregulating the petroleum in-
dustry.219 The trouble is, such a focal point tends to brush away 
negative environmental and public health effects as necessary 
compromises—compromises borne by communities who had no 
say in whether the tradeoff was worth it or not.  
As extensions of state governments, oil and gas agencies ex-
ist to serve in the interest of the public. When drilling on private 
lands, the petroleum industry is bound by the rules and proce-
dures of the state-level oil and gas agencies.220 Those agencies 
should act as guardians, carefully balancing the state’s interest 
in the economic benefits of drilling with the state’s interest in 
the health and well-being of its citizenry and environment. Too 
often, such agencies embrace the myopic efficiency arguments of 
the petroleum industry, rather than the long-term health and 
safety arguments posed by numerous non-industry parties. 
Hearing and notice procedures can help increase transparency 
and hold the industry accountable for its policies. 
B. A COMPARISON OF THE HEARING AND NOTICE REGIMES 
SURROUNDING THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN MONTANA AND 
COLORADO 
Despite the documented connection between these public 
health and safety problems and the petroleum industry, citizens 
have few avenues to prevent fracking-related harm before it oc-
curs.221 A common tactic in recent years has been the assertion 
of local control through ordinances: a county, say, will vote to 
ban fracking within its borders.222 These ordinances are often 
struck down in subsequent litigation on the grounds that state 
 
 219. See, e.g., Commissioner Wayne Christian, R.R COMM’N TEX., http://www 
.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/commissioners/christian (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) 
(“During his time in the Texas House, Christian . . . . accumulated a strong rec-
ord of standing for free markets and against burdensome regulations.”); see also 
Chairman Christi Craddick, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/ 
about-us/commissioners/craddick (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) (“Craddick has 
pushed to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of an energy industry that 
is driving the state’s unparalleled economic success.”). 
 220. See supra text accompanying notes 107–28. 
 221. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 222. See, e.g., Paul Rogers, Fracking Ban: Environmentalists Declare Victory 
on Monterey Measure Z, MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www 
.mercurynews.com/2016/11/09/fracking-ban-environmentalists-declare-victory 
-on-monterey-measure-z (describing a county that recently voted to ban frack-
ing within its limits). 
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law has already preempted them.223 Similarly, counties cannot 
veto an oil and gas board’s decision to locate a petroleum waste 
treating plant within their borders.224 
Another route for communities could be to sue their state 
when the oil and gas boards allegedly fail to adequately protect 
their interests.225 Or they could sue the oil companies.226 But, 
litigation is time-consuming and costly.227 Meanwhile, the harm 
has often already been inflicted. 
Given the absence of strong mechanisms for local control 
over fracking, perhaps the procedures of the state-level oil and 
gas agencies can help. If such agencies adopt stronger notice and 
comment regimes, then the public could have the opportunity to 
be involved in permitting decisions before harm to environmen-
tal and human health occurs. This Section addresses the benefits 
and drawbacks of the hearing and notice regimes governing the 
oil and gas agencies of Montana and Colorado, comparing them 
to their counterparts nationwide. The Section then considers 
 
 223. See, e.g., Swepi, LP v. Mora County, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1146 (D.N.M. 
2015) (“The Ordinance conflicts . . . with state law by prohibiting activities that 
state law permits: the production and extraction of oil and gas.”); Billy Corriher 
& Sean Wright, Ohio Supreme Court Says Towns Aren’t Allowed To Ban Frack-
ing, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.thinkprogress.org/ohio 
-supreme-court-says-towns-arent-allowed-to-ban-fracking (“[T]he state’s high 
court ruled that Ohio has ‘sole and exclusive’ authority over oil and gas produc-
tion, determining that the Ohio Constitution does not permit a local community 
to ban drilling approved by the state Department of Natural Resources.”); Mi-
chael Wines, Colorado Court Strikes Down Local Bans on Fracking, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/colorado-court-strikes 
-down-local-bans-on-fracking.html (“[T]he court said a moratorium in Fort Col-
lins and a ban in Longmont were invalid because state law pre-empted them.”). 
 224. See, e.g., Justices Say ND County Cannot Veto Site of Treating Facility, 
U.S. NEWS (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/north 
-dakota/articles/2017-03-07/justices-say-nd-county-cannot-veto-site-of-treating 
-facility (“[T]he sole authority for [such] zoning rests with the commission, 
which regulates energy development in the state.”). 
 225. See Danika Worthington, Neighborhood Group Sues State for Failing 
To Enforce Regulations over Oil and Gas, DENV. POST (Nov. 18, 2016), http:// 
www.denverpost.com/2016/11/18/neighborhood-sues-colorado-oil-and-gas. 
 226. See, e.g., Pawnee Nation Sues Oklahoma Oil Companies in Tribal Court 
Over Earthquake Damage, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/03/04/us/pawnee-nation-oklahoma-oil-earthquake-lawsuit.html 
(“The oil and gas industry has been the target of significant litigation over the 
years.”). 
 227. Along with the fact that such suits can be hard to win. See Ron Todt, 
$4.24M Verdict in Pennsylvania Drilling Lawsuit Tossed, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 1, 
2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/pennsylvania/articles/2017 
-04-01/424m-verdict-in-pennsylvania-drilling-lawsuit-tossed (finding conflict-
ing evidence for whether fracking caused water contamination). 
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whether those states’ procedures adequately protect the inter-
ests of the communities and property owners living near drilling 
operations. 
1. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Hearing and Notice 
Regime of the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation 
The Montana approach has uniquely strong hearing and no-
tice elements; of the ten states surveyed, no other state holds 
public hearings before deciding whether to grant a permit.228 A 
few states post a public notice after receiving a request for a 
wastewater injection permit.229 In Oklahoma, if a protest 
against an injection well is received within fifteen days, then the 
matter will be heard in front of an administrative law judge.230 
In Arkansas, protesters have even more power against injection 
wells: “If an objection is received the application shall be deemed 
denied.”231 However, the Texas Commission specifies that only 
an “affected person” is entitled to a protest hearing for an injec-
tion well, defining such a person as someone “who has suffered 
or will suffer actual injury or economic damage other than as a 
member of the general public.”232 While these states do manage 
to include the public in the decision-making process for injection 
well permits (which are the likely cause of the increased seismic 
activity), they do not have Montana’s protections to include local 
communities in the initial drilling permit decision. 
Along with its unusually robust hearing procedures, it is 
similarly unusual that Montana requires petroleum drillers to 
give public notice whenever the operator wishes to drill a well 
outside of existing fields.233 Perhaps this is because notice is gen-
erally required in Montana when the issue “is of significant in-
terest to the public.”234 This strong hearing and notice regime 
bolsters the Board’s goal of minimizing the harm that the oil and 
 
 228. See supra Table 1. 
 229. Id. 
 230. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-5-15(b)(4) (2016). 
 231. See ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N, supra note 171. 
 232. Protested Applications, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx 
.us/oil-gas/publications-and-notices/manuals/injectiondisposal-well-manual/ 
summary-of-standards-and-procedures/protested-applications (last visited Oct. 
13, 2017). 
 233. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n, supra note 6, at 3; 
see also MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.601(1) (2017). 
 234. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-103(1)(a) (2016). 
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gas operations can cause to nearby land and underground re-
sources.235 It errs on the side of ensuring the public’s right to 
information unless that information infringes on the right to in-
dividual privacy.236 
What is troubling with the Montana approach is the param-
eters of its notice requirements.237 Having a strong hearing re-
gime does not do much good if no one knows that they should 
demand one. Montana’s requirement to publish notice of a new 
well in the local newspaper and in Helena’s newspaper will no-
tify some citizens.238 But it is likely that numerous other citi-
zens, including possibly adjacent landowners, will receive no no-
tice of the new well until it is being constructed. This can be 
contrasted with the notice requirements many states enact for 
alerting certain individuals to imminent drilling activity: notice 
by certified mail.239 
If the adjacent landowners never receive notice, it could take 
time for them to learn of a new well’s existence—for example, a 
cattleman with a sprawling ranch may not use portions of his 
grazing land regularly. By the time he finds out that a well is 
being operated near his land, he might not have been able to take 
accurate baseline measurements of his water quality. Such data 
is important if a landowner later wants to file a nuisance lawsuit 
backed with proper evidentiary support. While the Montana 
hearing requirements are strong, the notice requirements do not 
ensure that parties who could be adversely affected by the drill-
ing will receive any advanced notice at all. 
2. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Hearing and Notice 
Regime of the Colorado Oil and Gas Commission 
The Colorado approach has many strengths. First, it in-
cludes a unique automatic notification tool: individuals may sign 
up to receive notice by mail about matters to be addressed in 
upcoming Commission meetings.240 This is much simpler than 
in Montana, where interested parties must carefully scan the 
 
 235. See Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation, supra note 132. 
 236. See Flesh v. Bd. of Trs., 786 P.2d 4, 9 (Mont. 1990) (“The public’s right 
to know is not absolute but must be balanced against the competing right to 
individual privacy.”). 
 237. See supra text accompanying notes 121–22, 142–43. 
 238. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 239. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-203 (2017) (requiring notice by mail to sur-
face owners); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.06(A)(9) (2016) (requiring notice by 
mail to urban landowners within 500 feet of the surface location of the well). 
 240. See supra text accompanying note 157. 
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Helena newspaper each day.241 It appears to be a unique feature 
among the states surveyed. The drawback of this tool is that 
many potentially affected parties likely will not know that they 
could have signed up for automatic notifications. 
The Commission’s general notice rule is also strong: when a 
person must be given notice, that notice must be mailed to them 
directly.242 This means that when an operator applies to 
“chang[e] certain well location setbacks” or applies for “involun-
tary pooling,” certain parties—usually other oil and gas opera-
tors—need to be notified directly.243 The Commission also re-
quires similar notice to be given to the local government 
designee, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Envi-
ronment, and Colorado Parks and Wildlife (when certain appli-
cations are filed).244 
This section of Colorado statute lacks any mention of direct 
notice to adjacent property owners who are not affiliated with 
the petroleum industry. Perhaps the local government designee 
is thought to suffice, since the issues listed (like involuntary 
pooling) mostly affect other operators and not the public at large. 
However, there is no parallel statute listing specific circum-
stances under which members of the public are entitled to no-
tice—not even for injection wells, as is required in Arkansas, Ok-
lahoma, and Texas.245 
The one instance when surface owners in Colorado do re-
ceive direct notice is when an operator files an application for 
increased well density. This triggers the option of a public fo-
rum.246 The ability to request a public forum can be contrasted 
with the ability to request a hearing in front of the Commission, 
as Montana statute permits.247 The benefits to Colorado’s public 
forum approach are clear. First, it is administratively simpler. 
The local community is granted the opportunity to comment on 
the deviation from standard well density, but the Commission 
itself does not have to spend its time overseeing these proceed-
ings (it receives a report and a record of them).248 Second, the 
parties likely to be affected by the decision are notified about the 
 
 241. See supra text accompanying notes 142–43. 
 242. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-108(4) (2016). 
 243. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:507(b) (2016). 
 244. Id. § 404-1:507(c). 
 245. See supra Table 1. 
 246. See supra text accompanying notes 162–66. 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 144–45. 
 248. See supra text accompanying note 166. 
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public forum by personal mail three weeks in advance, with an 
additional notice posted in local newspapers two weeks in ad-
vance.249 Third, not only are local citizens properly notified, but 
they also do not have to travel very far to participate in the per-
mit process. Holding public forums in the affected communities 
might increase turnout and foster a more meaningful discussion 
of an operator’s application. 
Despite these strengths, Colorado’s approach has its draw-
backs. The public forum option is only available when an opera-
tor applies to increase well density beyond what is statutorily 
permissible.250 The implicit presumption is that Colorado’s re-
strictions on well density ensure safety—that is, if operators 
abide by the current restrictions, they will pose no significant 
health or safety threats to the public. But, the existence of even 
one drilling unit can lead to wastewater spills or air pollution 
that affect the health of nearby communities. Communities in 
Colorado are not involved in the initial question—whether or not 
to allow the drilling unit at all. 
C. THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF WHO IS A MEMBER OF 
STATE-LEVEL OIL AND GAS AGENCIES AND WHO IS NOT 
Regardless of how local community members feel about a 
new drilling unit, the decision of whether to grant a permit ulti-
mately rests with the individual members of the state-level oil 
and gas agencies. While they often take the public’s perspective 
into consideration in the form of hearings or public forums, it is 
the agency’s vote, not any public vote, that determines whether 
an operator may proceed with a particular aspect of the drilling 
process. For this reason, the perspectives and priorities of those 
individual members can greatly affect how the oil and gas agen-
cies approach permit requests. 
This Section will compare how Montana, Colorado, and the 
other states surveyed have designed and empowered their oil 
and gas agencies. It first discusses why the required attributes 
of the individual members are important, as well as raising the 
concern that these attributes could lead to regulatory capture by 
the petroleum industry. This Section then briefly assesses the 
relative merits of appointing or electing board members, as well 
as the relative merits of having a smaller or a larger board. 
 
 249. See supra text accompanying notes 163–64. 
 250. See supra text accompanying note 162. 
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1. Who Has a Vote, Who Does Not, and Why It Might Matter 
Montana’s statute emphasizes a balance between members 
who have been affiliated with the petroleum industry (at least 
three members) and those who are unaffiliated landowners (at 
least two members).251 The remaining two members are unspec-
ified, though one of the seven members must be an attorney.252 
Conceivably, the remaining two members could also have con-
nections to the petroleum industry. All seven members are ap-
pointed in two batches by the Governor with no restrictions on 
political party affiliations. This statutory setup means that, for 
the last two years of a governor’s term, the Board could be a fully 
partisan entity dominated by individuals who have been affili-
ated with the petroleum industry. By not requiring any members 
who specialize in public or environmental health, the Board 
could inadvertently minimize such perspectives in the same way 
that the industry itself tends to dismiss health concerns. 
By contrast, Colorado’s statutory requirements create a 
Commission that ensures a broader set of viewpoints.253 The ex-
ecutive directors of the Department of Natural Resources and 
the Department of Public Health and Environment—both of 
whom have a vote—sit alongside the seven members appointed 
by the Governor.254 Although three of the elected members must 
be affiliated with the petroleum industry, there must also be 
members with “substantial experience” in both wildlife protec-
tion and soil conservation.255 Those members are in addition to 
the two ex officio executive directors. Colorado also avoids a fully 
partisan Commission by requiring that no more than four of the 
appointed members be of the same party.256 
 
 251. See supra text accompanying notes 129–33. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 147–50. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. The “substantial environmental or wildlife protection experience” 
member could be an environmental lawyer rather than a scientist. See Colorado 
Oil & Gas Conservation Commissioners, COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION 
COMM’N, http://cogcc.state.co.us/about.html#/commissioners (last visited Oct. 
13, 2017) (showing that the current member in this position is an environmental 
lawyer). Similarly, Colorado’s requirement for a member with “substantial soil 
conservation experience” is currently filled by someone with degrees in geology. 
Id. 
 256. See Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commissioners, supra note 255. 
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Colorado is unique among the states surveyed: no other 
state requires any specific representation for public health, nat-
ural resources, soil conservation, or wildlife protection.257 Ohio 
comes closest by requiring that one of its five members represent 
“the public.”258 By contrast, Arkansas only requires that “at 
least” a majority of its nine members have some kind of experi-
ence with oil and gas.259 North Dakota does not require any oil 
and gas experience for its three ex officio Commission members, 
but amends this potential deficit by using a subsidiary body to 
make permit decisions.260 Wyoming also has a Commission that 
includes three ex officio members, but requires that its two ap-
pointed members be “qualified to serve the oil and gas industry 
of the state.”261 
Compared to the other states surveyed, the statutory re-
quirements of Colorado’s Commission result in an agency that 
must assess oil and gas permit decisions in a more holistic man-
ner. Local communities and environmental organizations could 
perhaps pitch their concerns to the Commission without feeling 
like it was a procedural protest. By giving public health and the 
environment a seat within the agency, Colorado’s approach 
likely diminishes threats to health and safety before they occur. 
It also lessens the likelihood of regulatory capture. 
Regulatory capture occurs when a government agency be-
comes, in effect, controlled by the industry that it was supposed 
to be regulating.262 On the one hand, it is clearly important that 
some members who sit on oil and gas boards have a familiarity 
with oil and gas production. On the other hand, by focusing ex-
clusively on members with experience in the petroleum industry, 
states run the risk of creating agencies that, in the words of the 
Wyoming statute, “serve the oil and gas industry” rather than 
the public.263 The potential for regulatory capture is most acute 
in a state like Arkansas, where the entire nine-person commis-
sion could come from (or plan to go to) the petroleum industry.264 
 
 257. See supra Table 1. 
 258. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.35(a) (2016). 
 259. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-71-102(b) (2017). 
 260. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 38-08.1-04.1(3), 54-17-01 (2017). 
 261. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-103(a) (2017). 
 262. See Regulatory Capture, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/r/regulatory-capture.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 263. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-103(a). 
 264. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POS-
SIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 49 (2008) (“Administrators cater 
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Even when revolving-door concerns are absent, the agency might 
be structured in a way that implicitly leads to capture.265 Or per-
haps one interest group is supplying a disproportionate amount 
of the data on which that agency relies to make regulatory deci-
sions.266 While citizens rarely participate in regulatory decision-
making, interest groups can routinely exert pressure on an 
agency.267 Intuitively, states that require diverse oil and gas 
boards (like Colorado) are better poised to combat these con-
cerns. 
What about situations where the agency has no quota for 
industry representation because the members are elected rather 
than appointed? How might that affect the allegiance of certain 
board members? Because of the dynamic of campaign donations, 
members can feel beholden to the industry. The following Sub-
section briefly considers this phenomenon.  
2. Competing Models: Should Board Members Be Elected or 
Appointed? 
Of the ten states surveyed, most have charged the governor 
with appointing their oil and gas board members. Certain re-
strictions are often placed on the governor—for example, requir-
ing that a limited number of the members be of the same political 
party, or requiring that a certain number of members have oil 
 
legislators but rather to advance their own interests, such as favorable future 
employment prospects with regulated interests.”). Similarly, lawmakers in 
Idaho recently overhauled its Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to replace 
“mostly citizen commissioners with three industry experts, an elected county 
commissioner and the director of the Idaho Department of Lands.” Keith Ridler, 
Overhaul of Idaho Oil and Gas Laws Include New Commission, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 
27, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/idaho/articles/2017-04-27/ 
overhaul-of-idaho-oil-and-gas-laws-includes-new-commission. 
 265. See CROLEY, supra note 264, at 50 (“Although agency personnel are not 
motivated to engage in regulatory favoritism, for structural-institutional rea-
sons their decisions nevertheless tend to be biased in favor of special interests.”). 
 266. Id. (“Information biases may then translate into regulatory biases.”). 
 267. Id. at 21 (“For ordinary citizens, the costs of registering or even of for-
mulating regulatory preferences far exceed the benefits. Not so for organized 
interest groups. . . . Given that the benefits of regulatory goods are higher for 
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and gas experience.268 North Dakota and Wyoming take a hybrid 
approach: North Dakota’s three ex officio members (all elected) 
delegate some powers to a division, the head of which was ap-
pointed;269 Wyoming’s Governor is a member of its Board, along 
with four appointed members (two of whom serve ex officio).270 
Oklahoma and Texas both elect their three-person commis-
sions that oversee, among other things, the oil and gas develop-
ment in those states.271 This approach abandons any particular 
design (like Colorado’s carefully balanced commission) and in-
stead places the decision directly in the hands of voters. The 
question is, by electing their oil and gas board members, are the 
citizens of Oklahoma and Texas somehow better off? Can an 
elected oil and gas board more nimbly and adequately address 
the needs of local communities? 
For reasons similar to the regulatory capture analysis 
above,272 the answer is likely no. Individuals running for office 
must solicit campaign donations. This grants the petroleum in-
dustry an opportunity to invest in certain candidates to encour-
age their allegiance to the industry.273 Elected officials can even 
receive substantial donations after entering office. For example, 
an elected commissioner of Oklahoma’s oil and gas agency col-
lected an additional $80,000 after his election win—“mostly from 
donors in the oil and gas industry.”274 The hazards of fracking 
are most acute for those living near drill and wastewater sites.275 
These affected individuals are neither as numerous nor as orga-
nized as the petroleum industry. When Oklahoma was con-
fronted with its recent spate of unprecedented earthquakes, the 
 
 268. See, e.g., supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text (describing the sys-
tem in Colorado). 
 269. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 54-17-02 (2017); North Dakota Industrial 
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 271. See supra text accompanying notes 194–99. 
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 275. See supra notes 74–102 and accompanying text. 
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avowedly pro-fracking Commissioners276 and skeptical Gover-
nor277 were slow to acknowledge the likely link to the injection 
wells. The Commissioners ultimately decided to work within the 
existing laws rather than impose, say, a moratorium on 
wastewater injection or enact any new regulations.278 If elected 
leaders fail to rapidly address something as glaring as the dan-
gers of earthquakes, how can they be expected to adequately ad-
dress invisible harms like air pollution? 
It appears that being an elected member of an oil and gas 
board does not inherently make those members more sympa-
thetic or responsive to public health concerns. Appointed boards 
are, of course, susceptible to their own problems. Governors can 
use appointments to reward loyal party members (rather than 
select individuals on merit alone), leading to “old boy syn-
drome.”279 Even though members of appointed boards do not re-
ceive campaign contributions, such boards could still be subject 
to regulatory capture. However, on balance, the appointed 
boards are more insulated from the industry, which may help 
them address public health concerns more effectively. 
This Part assessed, first, the tension between the petroleum 
industry’s interest in efficiency and the public’s interest in 
health and safety. This tension is often embodied within the oil 
and gas boards themselves, which can strengthen the position of 
either side by adopting certain notice and comment regimes. The 
particular board members, including their backgrounds and 
which group’s interests they are designated to represent, will 
also affect how this tension gets resolved. The final Part makes 
recommendations on these matters. 
 
 276. See, e.g., Bob Anthony, Response to Attacks on Hydraulic Fracturing (A 
Proven Well Completion Technology for Shale Gas), OKLA. CORP. COMM’N (Mar. 
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 279. See, e.g., Nancy McCarthy, Elect or Appoint Bar Board Members? For 
Some, That Is the Question, CAL. B.J. (Apr. 2011), http://www.calbarjournal 
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III.  LIMITING HARM BEFORE IT OCCURS: WAYS TO 
STRENGTHEN THE PUBLIC’S ROLE IN THE PERMIT 
PROCESS   
The final Part of this Note attempts to reconcile the compet-
ing interests of the petroleum industry and the public in a way 
that tips the balance toward the interests of property owners and 
community members. Giving nearby landowners a greater role 
in the permit process would require that state-level oil and gas 
agencies consider the perspective of those landowners when de-
ciding whether to grant a permit. Because the current regulatory 
regime tends to favor efficiency over transparency and public 
health, this Note suggests a solution that gives the public a 
stronger role. 
Section A proposes that because fracking and its associated 
waste products are hazardous to human and environmental 
health, nearby landowners are entitled to actual notice by mail 
and a public forum for all new exploratory wells outside of exist-
ing fields. Then, Section B proposes that state-level oil and gas 
agencies use a modified Colorado model: they must include at 
least one board member who specializes in public health, and one 
board member who specializes in ecology or biology. Finally, Sec-
tion C proposes that each oil and gas agency establish an epide-
miological monitoring program to be implemented at petroleum 
exploration fields. It should not be incumbent on individual citi-
zens to collect data and monitor the toxic byproducts of drilling 
operations near their homes. 
A. AN APPLICATION FOR NEW EXPLORATORY WELLS SHOULD 
MANDATE MAILED NOTICE TO NEARBY LANDOWNERS AND A 
PUBLIC FORUM 
Property owners and communities have a right to know 
about and comment on proposed oil and gas drilling projects be-
fore they occur. The need for transparency and public involve-
ment can be balanced against the efficiency arguments that the 
petroleum industry and the oil and gas boards often make. Be-
cause any new exploratory well has the potential to become a 
fully operating well and harm environmental health, Montana is 
right to view such permit requests as worthy of heightened scru-
tiny.280 However, its form of notice and its subsequent hearing 
in front of the Board are not the best solution. Oil and gas boards 
 
 280. See supra text accompanying notes 33–73 (describing an overview of the 
drilling process). 
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should instead use Colorado’s public forum approach, which is 
procedurally simpler but accomplishes the same goal.281 
When an oil and gas board receives a permit request for a 
new exploratory well outside of an existing field, it should alert, 
by direct mail, the state’s department charged with overseeing 
public health and the department that oversees conservation or 
wildlife issues. The board should also alert, by direct mail, an 
appointed person in the county seat of the requested drilling pro-
ject. If any of those three parties request a public forum in the 
county seat, then a public forum will be arranged. Concurrently, 
any landowners within a reasonable distance of the land on 
which the well is proposed should also be directly notified with 
the option to request a public forum. At a minimum, this should 
include landowners who share a property line with the affected 
parcel. Lastly, mandatory notice in local newspapers and the 
major newspaper of that state’s capital should allow any other 
interested party to request a public forum. 
Next, if someone does request a public forum, then those 
same nearby landowners should be notified by mail about the 
forum at least three weeks in advance. Local newspapers and 
the major newspaper of that state’s capital would run a notice at 
least two weeks in advance. The costs incurred during both 
rounds of notice should be billed to the operator requesting the 
permit. Although e-mail alerts could be useful in some circum-
stances, e-mail would work less well for full notice requirements. 
This is because, unlike landowner records and addresses, there 
is not yet a local registry of each individual’s primary e-mail ad-
dress. Additionally, nearly a quarter of the people living in rural 
areas—the places most affected by the petroleum exploration—
still do not regularly use the Internet.282 
Finally, if a public forum occurs, then the local official in 
charge of the forum would produce a report to be sent to the oil 
and gas agency. The report should be made public on the 
agency’s website, perhaps including a full transcript and video 
of the proceedings. If the proposed well is ultimately approved, 
then the community will likely be more knowledgeable about its 
potential health threats because of the public forum. The public 
 
 281. In Colorado, public forums are sometimes used if an application violates 
well density limitations. See supra text accompanying notes 162–66. 
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forum would “afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions.”283 Local communities cannot unilaterally prevent oil and 
gas projects from showing up in their peripheries. But, these 
steps will promote a more well-informed community. They will 
also create a record of the specific concerns about a new drilling 
location, which could be useful in future litigation.  
The drawback to this plan lies in its compromise. By substi-
tuting Montana’s hearings with public forums, individuals are 
no longer making arguments in front of the board itself. Instead, 
their concerns are bundled into a tidy report to be perused by the 
board in a distant city. An in-person discussion with the ultimate 
decision-makers could make citizens’ concerns more psychologi-
cally persuasive. The plan also lessens the efficiency of the per-
mit process by adding extra procedures. In turn, this increases 
uncertainty for drillers; if their permit is finally approved, per-
haps the board would tack on unpredictable and costly stipula-
tions based on community concerns. Especially concerning for 
drillers may be the ability for any interested party to request a 
public forum. What if environmental organizations stymie every 
single permit request with a public forum demand?  
These drawbacks—for both sides—seem outweighed by the 
benefits. The public forum option is only offered, as in Montana 
law, when a permit is requested to drill outside of an existing 
field.284 Even if environmental organizations managed to ar-
range a public forum for each of those permit requests, the 
stakes are not as high as during a formal hearing; the public fo-
rum will produce no final, binding decision. It is less burdensome 
for locals (who do not have to travel to a board meeting to be 
heard) and less burdensome for the oil and gas boards. At the 
same time, locals receive the notice and the ability to comment 
that are currently lacking in most states. As parties whose rights 
may be affected by the drilling, they “are entitled to be heard.”285 
B. STATE-LEVEL OIL AND GAS AGENCIES SHOULD INCLUDE 
MEMBERS WHO SPECIALIZE IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND ECOLOGY 
When making regulatory decisions, oil and gas boards must 
balance efficiency with the public interest. This balance is deter-
mined in part by the members themselves. How states decide 
who is a member of such agencies and who is not will affect how 
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that agency frames the issues that come before it. Without rep-
resentation in the agency, some groups will have a much weaker 
voice in the agency’s decisions than the groups that did receive 
representation. The connection between the petroleum industry 
and threats to public health is well documented and regularly 
demonstrated. For this reason, oil and gas boards should include 
representatives from those fields as permanent, voting mem-
bers. 
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Commission serves as 
an exemplary entity in this regard. Not only are the Department 
of Natural Resources and the Department of Public Health and 
Environment both present on the Commission, but the ap-
pointed members must also represent specific public and envi-
ronmental health needs.286 This is not redundant. By mandating 
that five of the nine Commission members represent public or 
environmental health, Colorado can better assess the immediate 
harms associated with drilling. It is also in a better position to 
make long-term decisions about what is in the state’s best inter-
est, since, theoretically, the individuals representing public 
health or the environment are less motivated by short-term eco-
nomic gains and are more concerned with the far-reaching im-
plications of today’s policies. 
A problematic aspect of Colorado’s arrangement is that an 
environmental lawyer can qualify as the member with “substan-
tial environmental or wildlife protection experience.”287 Environ-
mental lawyers do not necessarily know much about ecology or 
how ecosystems function. To better address potential environ-
mental harms, the members representing the environment 
should be trained in natural sciences. Each oil and gas board 
should contain one member trained and working as an ecologist 
or biologist and another trained in public health. Whether this 
requirement would be filled by ex officio members of relevant 
agencies, or by separate individuals, or by both (like Colorado) 
would depend on each state. 
This Note also recommends that: (1) oil and gas agency 
members be appointed by the governor; and (2) that they require 
someone “trained in geology” rather than “with experience in the 
petroleum industry.” Both of these suggestions aim to minimize 
the likelihood of regulatory capture. The former assures the pub-
lic that the members of their state’s oil and gas board were not 
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simply bought through industry donations and campaign contri-
butions. The latter distinction makes clear that it is the geologic 
skills and knowledge that are needed—whether those skills were 
honed in the industry, in the government, or in academia. 
The details of both this proposal and the former one could 
be assessed by a legislative committee, or could be determined 
by the oil and gas boards themselves through adequate hearing 
and notice procedures. States might vary in which particular 
health or environmental departments should be present on oil 
and gas agencies. They might also vary in the particular scien-
tific specialties of the appointed members, depending on what 
ecosystems are most threatened by the industry in that particu-
lar state. Similarly, the precise parameters of who receives direct 
notice for new exploratory permits could depend on local factors, 
such as the likely fallout zone of any health risks. This could be 
assessed by determining the mile range around a drilling site in 
which air quality could be diminished or by examining the paths 
of streamflow to estimate the exposure route of a potential sur-
face-level wastewater spill. 
C. STATE-LEVEL OIL AND GAS AGENCIES SHOULD ESTABLISH 
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL MONITORING PROGRAMS 
Finally, oil and gas boards should adopt the epidemiological 
monitoring program suggested by The Endocrine Disruption Ex-
change.288 In a paper published in 2011, the organization recom-
mended the “environmental monitoring of air and water as well 
as any health changes in those living and working in regions of 
natural gas operations.”289 At the very least, the enhanced notice 
and comment regime proposed in this Note will allow communi-
ties to do such monitoring on their own before and after the drill-
ing activity. But, not all communities will have the ability—or 
resources—to do so. This is why all oil and gas boards should 
establish their own epidemiological monitoring programs. The 
boards themselves, perhaps through their public health mem-
ber, would collect data on environmental and human health near 
drilling operations. This data would be available to the public in 
 
 288. See Theo Colborn et al., Natural Gas Operations from a Public Health 
Perspective, 17 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: AN INT’L J. 1039, 1055 
(2011) (“Given the general consistency of reported adverse health effects by cit-
izens and laborers across many gas plays, public health authorities should es-
tablish an epidemiological monitoring program . . . in order to increase power 
and be able to reach conclusions early on.”). 
 289. Id. 
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regular reports. That way, public health officials and concerned 
citizens can better assess the ongoing risks posed by any partic-
ular drilling field. 
Certainly, such a plan would provoke outcry: let the oil and 
gas boards be in charge of issuing permits, and let the public 
health and environmental agencies be in charge of regulation. 
That fragmented approach has not been working in most states. 
Public health and environmental agencies must mitigate harms 
that have already occurred. It is time to bring fracking-related 
public health problems to the fore and put the onus for their 
oversight where it belongs: with the initial permitting bodies.  
  CONCLUSION   
The ability to frack the natural gas out of tight shale for-
mations has certainly been a boon for energy independence in 
the United States and for the petroleum industry. However, the 
drilling process and its associated wastewater pose health and 
safety risks to humans living nearby and to the environment at 
large. Depending on which state they live in, landowners could 
wake up to a drilling operation on the other side of their property 
line without receiving any notice and without ever having an op-
portunity to voice their concerns. 
When designing their oil and gas boards, states attempt to 
balance the interests of the industry and local communities. But, 
they often fall short of protecting public health. Because of the 
documented health risks that the oil and gas industry poses to 
humans and the environment at large, state legislatures should 
modify their oil and gas boards. By mandating that a public 
health specialist and ecologist sit in those agencies, and by man-
dating that the boards monitor oil and gas pollution for epidemi-
ological threats, the health of local communities and ecosystems 
would no longer be an afterthought. In turn, the public should 
be equipped with a stronger notice and comment regime. These 
suggestions will not ensure that a community has given its full, 
informed consent to any particular drilling project. But, by shift-
ing the emphasis to public and environmental health, oil and gas 
boards can help preempt harm. 
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Notice to 
Surface 
Owners 
for New 
Explora-
tory Well 
Permits 
Notice to 
Public for 
New Explora-
tory Well Per-
mits 
Public 
Hearing for 
New Ex-
ploratory 
Well Per-
mits 
Notice to 
Public for 
Wastewater 
Injection 
Permits 
Number 
of Board 
or Com-
mission 
Members 
Require-
ment for 
Public 
Health 
or Scien-
tist 
Member 
Arkansas Y290 N291 N292 Y293 9294 N295 
Colorado Y296 
Nearby Land-
owners297 or 
Upon Re-
quest298 
N299 Y300 9301 Y302 
Montana Y303 Y304 Upon Re-quest305 N
306 7307 N308 
 
 290. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-203(a) (2017). 
 291. Id. § 15-72-203(c)(4) (“After written notice of the operator’s intent to 
begin shale operations is given under this subsection, an operator is not re-
quired to give any other notice . . . .”). 
 292. See id. § 15-72-203. 
 293. ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N, GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, GENERAL 
RULE H 192–214 (2016), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/rules/rulesregs.pdf. 
 294. Id. § 15-71-102(a)–(b). 
 295. Id. 
 296. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:305.c(1) (2017). 
 297. Id. 
 298. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-108(5) (2016). 
 299. See COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:305. 
 300. COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 404-1:325.j, :325.n. 
 301. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104(2)(a)(I). 
 302. Id. 
 303. ENVTL. QUALITY COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO SPLIT ESTATES IN OIL AND GAS 
DEVELOPMENT 2 (2013), http://leg.mt.gov/content/publications/environmental/ 
hb790brochure.pdf.  
 304. MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.601(1), 36.22.620(2) (2017).  
 305. Id. at 36.22.601(4). 
 306. See id. at 36.22.1403. 
 307. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-3303(2) (2015).  
 308. Id. 
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New York Y309 N310 N311 Y312 N/A313 N314 
North  
Dakota Y
315 Nearby Land-owners316 N
317 Y318 3319 N320 
Ohio Y321 
Nearby Ur-
ban Land-
owners322 
N323 N324 5325 N326 
 
 309. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0305 (McKinney) at ¶ 13. 
 310. “Public hearings are held when there is dispute about the spacing units 
for a formation or if the entire mineral property to be affected by the project is 
not contractually under the control of the applicant. This is not typical in NY; 
however, in these cases, a notice is posted to the ENB [Environmental Notice 
Bulletin].” Email from a civil servant, N.Y. Bureau of Oil & Gas Permitting & 
Mgmt., Div. of Mineral Res., to author (Mar. 9, 2017, 15:25 CST) (on file with 
author). 
 311. Id. 
 312. The EPA has full oversight of New York’s underground injection pro-
gram. See Primary Enforcement Authority for the Underground Injection, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/uic/primary-enforcement-authority-underground-injection 
-control-program (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). It publishes notice of proposed per-
mits on its website. See Underground Injection Control in EPA Region 2, (NJ, 
NY, PR, and VI), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/uic/underground-injection-control 
-epa-region-2-nj-ny-pr-and-vi (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).  
 313. See Division of Mineral Resources, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVA-
TION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/about/636.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). The Di-
vision of Mineral Resources has three offices handling oil and gas drilling per-
mits, with ten people working on permits. E-mail from C. Scott Dietzel, Mineral 
Res. Specialist 2, N.Y. Bureau of Oil & Gas Permitting & Mgmt., Div. of Mineral 
Res., to author (Mar. 10, 2017, 08:26 CST) (on file with author). 
 314. E-mail from Thomas E. Noll, Dir., N.Y. Bureau of Oil & Gas Permitting 
& Mgmt., Div. of Mineral Res., to author (Mar. 17, 2017, 09:35 CDT) (on file 
with author). 
 315. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08.1-04.1(4) (2017). 
 316. Id. 
 317. See id. §§ 38-08.1-04, -04.1. 
 318. N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-05-04(1) (2017) (“No underground injection 
may be conducted without obtaining a permit from the commission after notice 
and hearing.”).  
 319. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-17-02. 
 320. Id. 
 321. OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.06(A)(9) (2017). 
 322. Id. §§ 1509.06(A)(9), .60. 
 323. See id. § 1509.06. 
 324. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3745-34-12 (2016).  
 325. OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.35(A). 
 326. Id. 
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Okla-
homa Y
327 N328 N329 Y330 3331 N332 
Pennsyl-
vania Y
333 Nearby Land-owners334 N
335 Y336 N/A337 N338 
Texas Y339 N340 N341 Y342 3343 N344 
Wyoming Y345 N346 N347 N348 5349 N350 
 
 
 327. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-1(g) (2016). 
 328. See id. § 165:10-3-1. 
 329. See id. 
 330. Id. § 165:10-5-5(d).  
 331. See OKLA. CORP. COMM’N, http://www.occeweb.com/index.html. 
 332. OKLA. CONST. art. 9, § 16.  
 333. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3211 (b)(2), (b.1) (2017). 
 334. “The applicant shall forward by certified mail a copy of the plat to . . . 
all surface landowners and water purveyors, whose water supplies are within 
1,000 feet of the proposed well location . . . .” Id. § 3211(b)(2). 
 335. See id. §§ 3211, 3212. 
 336. The EPA has full oversight of Pennsylvania’s underground injection 
program. See EPA, supra note 312. It publishes notice of proposed permits on 
its website. See Underground Injection Control in EPA Region 3 (DE, DC, MD, 
PA, VA, and WV), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/uic/underground-injection-control 
-epa-region-3-de-dc-md-pa-va-and-wv (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).  
 337. See Office of Oil and Gas Management, PENN. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., 
http://www.dep.pa.gov/business/energy/oilandgasprograms/oilandgasmgmt/ 
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 338. See id.  
 339. See JUDON FAMBROUGH, REAL ESTATE CENTER, MINERALS, SURFACE 
RIGHTS AND ROYALTY PAYMENTS 1 (2009), https://assets.recenter.tamu.edu/ 
documents/articles/840.pdf. 
 340. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.5 (2017). 
 341. See id.  
 342. Id. § 3.9(5)(D).  
 343. See Commissioners, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/ 
about-us/commissioners (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). 
 344. Id. 
 345. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-5-402(b), -403(a) (2017). 
 346. See id.  
 347. See id.  
 348. See OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, WYO. ADMIN. R. ch. 3 (2016). 
 349. Id. § 30-5-103(a). 
 350. Id. 
